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INTRODUCTION 
"At the current prices for corn it would be wise to hedge for it is 
doubtful if this level of prices will hold." Suggestions like the above 
can sometimes be read in many farm publications. The puzzling element of 
the comment is just when to hedge. The person making the statement does 
not say whether to do it immediately, tomorrow, a week from now or when . 
Perhaps the price will fall, but perhaps equally likely the price will 
move higher . Perhaps there is good reason for its current strength . 
Oftentimes when there are strong upward surges in price, the market 
overreacts. The price rises beyond the equilibrium point and then sinks 
back. Is tomorrow, next week, or next month the best time to hedge? 
This study is an attempt to ascertain if the use of certain selected 
mechanical hedging strategies can be of benefit in placing hedges by 
producers and marketing firms. 
Farmers are interested in selling at a high price. Marketing firms 
are interested in making a satisfactory or better margin on each sale. 
They want to capture the price rises and avoid the declines . Producers 
often argue that they combat the price variation by weekly or regular 
marketings . The optimum, however, would be lump-sum selling. Again the 
problem arises as to when would be the best time to market the product. 
One finds that farmers and elevator operators are the actual losers 
if hedges are made at the wrong time as they own the commodities. If 
merchandising firms hedge and the price falls and the basis (the difference 
between cash and future) narrows they receive a profit or benefit from the 
hedge. What if the price rises? The operator makes a profit if the basis 
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pattern is as expected, but perhaps less than would have been attained if 
he were in an open position and prices rose. A method selecting between 
the two alternatives--remaining open or hedging--might improve the profit 
situation . Hedging strategies may provide possibilities to eliminate 
losses from remaining open and to refrain from hedging too quickly when 
it appears a hedge is worthy of consideration. 
Merchandisers and producers are searching for methods of constant 
price protection. These individuals have continuous exposure to the 
market's fluctuations. Mechanical hedging strategies may offer some 
help. Subjectivity could possibly be reduced with these strategies. Of 
course, the decision variables in mechanical strategies are subjective 
but they can be held constant once established. The downfall of many 
operators is the sporadic, arbitrary involvement of the decision maker . 
There are a large number of trading strategies recommended by brokerage 
houses, but generally they are variations of the same few basic methods . 
The primary intent of this paper is to test the worthiness of various 
trading strategies and to sort out the better ones. 
The use of hedging strategies may require that one be ready to remove 
a hedge already placed. It is often stated that once a hedge is placed, 
it should not be lifted. The reasoning is that the producer or merchant 
hedged in a profit at the time he made the transaction and he should stick 
with it rather than trading in and out of the market. This may have been 
a good rule of thumb or policy when prices fluctuated in a range of less 
than say ten cents for the year. However, it violates the opportunity cost 
concept which, next to the principle of marginality, is central to the 
theories of the firm and consumption. With the major bull markets of the 
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70's, why remain in a losing position? This concept of lifting a hedge 
and when to reenter a hedge again evolves around timing. Mechanical 
hedging strategies should suggest the proper decision as prices oftentimes 
follow patterns. Thus, the attempt is to capitalize on these price move-
ments with mechanical hedging strategies. 
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Grain producers are faced with a great deal of risk in the production 
and storage of commodities. Some of these risks are insurable. The 
emphasis of the decision maker after the commodity is harvested is on 
storing and marketing. Marketing has become a bigger factor for the 
farmer as loan programs are essentially eliminated and farmers control 
larger quantities of grain each year. Marketing is an aspect that can 
eliminate some grain producers from business if costs are high and they 
sell for $.50 to $1.00 less than o ther producers. Indeed, prices have 
recently fluctuated $1.50 on corn and as much as $7.00 on soybeans in 
the same year. 
Hedging is a form of marketing insurance for the producer. Hedging 
solves some problems but creates others . Before dwelling on hedging, one 
should examine the relevant criteria a farmer should consider in mak.ing 
his marketing decision. First of all, what are his objectives? Are taxes 
or possibly limited storage space a restraint? There are a vast number of 
variables which enter into the decision mak.ing. To focus on marketing, 
assume there is no time or physical restraint . Then how should the pro-
ducer value his grain at any moment in time? One school of thought evolves 
around production costs. This seems to be an inappropriate way of evaluat-
ing the grain as opportunity costs are not considered. 
Another school of thought is the opportunity cost concept. What can 
the grain be sold for today? Just because one has an expensive method of 
production does not mean he will receive more money per bushel . The 
current local market price becomes the relevant standard . 
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By using the current market, the producer is faced with the same 
situation as the elevator operator. Tite one difference is the place of 
storage. Perhaps producers and elevator operators should calculate 
their carrying costs with the same objective. As price rises cause 
interest costs to increase, the decision maker must have expectations of 
a greater margin to induce storage. Th.e producer and merchandising firm 
have for the most part the same set of costs. Some alternatives for 
disposing of the commodity would be as follows: (a) remain open and 
store, (b) hedge (short the futures, long the cash), (c) enter and exit 
from a hedge according to some trading plan, and (d) contract for delivery 
at a later date. 
The first alternative is probably the one most used currently by pro-
ducers . Upon surveying the price movements of the last two years, this 
might have been the most sound action in the recent past. 
1he second and third hedging plans are really rival theories. 
Hedging in practice is generally considered a fixed forward contract. 
Traditionally, once the decision maker took a position, he was expected to 
remain with it. This is the prevailing philosophy in the industry . If 
the operator employs a short hedge or selling hedge, he is protected 
against a price decline. However, there are a number of problems that 
can arise. Consider this. Should one maintain a hedge in a bull market? 
Margin calls can be unhealthy for an ongoing concern with a short 
hedge in a bull market. This sometimes turns into unnecessary losses. 
Many operators are willing to accept a certain profit and be satisfied . 
However, until the recent past, they would have maintained their positions. 
Currently the atmosphere of the grain markets is one of wide price swings . 
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Of course, cash may be rising at a rate equivalent to futures. However, 
the point is that greater benefits may be available by reverting back to 
the first strategy--remaining open. One should liquidate his position if 
there is an overwhelming probability of price increasing and admit to bad 
judgment for acting prematurely. It is no crime to do so. Th.is notion 
violates basic hedging theory according to traditionalists. Has the hedger 
become a speculator? 
A hedger is a special type of speculator. For this study one 
normally thinks of speculation as taking positions in the futures market 
in hope for a profit without having a commitment in the cash. There is 
one difficulty with the above argument. In the real world, individuals 
sometimes are forced to maintain a hedge due to capital requirements. 
This is more true of elevator operators than farmers. Suppose an elevator 
has in storage 10,000 bushels of soybeans. Connnercial banks will loan, 
say 60 percent of the value of the soybeans if in a cash position but, if 
hedged, will loan 85 percent. This requires less owner's equity. The 
trade-off is between the money needed for margin requirement and money 
needed to remain open. During a major bull market, one might be as well 
off to drop to the 60 percent loan rate. Th.is initial investment to 
purchase the grain is fixed. When the value of soybeans rises, one will 
be able to obtain as many bushels in the open position as one could 
maintaining a hedge position. Hedgers are in both the cash and futures 
markets. They are speculating in the basis or the relationship between 
cash and futures . The hedger looks at a relationship, and the speculator 
looks at the price level. 
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The decision maker normally uses the basis as one of his primary 
tools. The basis has a historical pattern and demonstrates the same 
general movement each year. It is widest during the peak of the harvest 
and narrows during the rest of the season unless some unexpected event 
disturbs the market . The basis will be greater at higher prices than at 
lower prices due to the interest costs. What if the basis widens? In 
other words, what is a good hedge and why? 1bese uncertainties are 
perplexing and the wrong decision can lead to devastating effects. 
The major purpose of this investigation is to evaluate the strategy 
of entering and exiting from a hedge according to a trading plan. If the 
strategies are useful, which one provides the optimum results? 1here 
exists a considerable number of possible strategies. However, they boil 
down to several basic formats, each with several variations. 
Another way to add support to moving in and out of the futures market 
rather than remain with a designated hedge is as follows: Rog producers 
who are "Inners-and-Outers", with proper timing, can attain higher profits 
than producers who are in constant production at a constant volume. A 
four to six year price cycle in hog production has existed since the 
1860 ' s . If one produces constantly, one is likely to suffer losses when 
the price has reached the bottom. When the price is at that point, one 
should be purchasing and breeding gilts. When the price reaches the top, 
and starts down, one should perhaps sell out. One should react in 
exactly the same manner when the price is at the low point again . 
Moving to the last alternative of contracting for later delivery, 
one finds th.e decision maker in a rather inflexible position once the 
agreement is made. Th.e physical connnodity must be delivered by a 
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specified date if one is to fulfill his contract . In practice, some 
farmers contract a portion of their crop as soon as the price is high 
enough to cover production costs. Bad harvest conditions can create 
difficulties in filling the contract. When using futures for price 
protection one can trade in and out of the position. Oftentimes farmers 
look foolish after contracting when there is a tremendous price surge. 
Of course, delivery must be made if the contract is held until expira-
tion. 
Another disadvantage of contracting is that the contract is 
generally made on a basis which is greater than what is expected to exist 
at delivery. One should examine this carefully for this should be a major 
bargaining point. Maybe one should negotiate for a set basis rather than 
a fixed price. It seems that producers should seldom contract their whole 
crop as definite production uncertainties exist until the commodity is 
harvested. Contracting, however, offers the benefit of not requiring 
margin money and, hence, one is not faced with margin calls . 
Many times contracting is a farmer's only protection if he is looking 
at forward price insurance by delivering. Farmers are not in a position 
to make delivery on a futures contract even if it is profitable. Also, 
they might not produce 5 ,000 bushels, the minimum quantity, which can be 
hedged. Tilis is an institutional block to the farmer . Farmers generally 
do not have access to load-out facilities for railroad cars, let alone be 
able to obtain the cars after they are ordered. 
Elevator operators have been caught in a similar squeeze recently 
with the shortage of railroad cars and the abundant harvests. If the 
elevator operator orders cars sporadically and does not have any leased 
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on a long term basis, he cannot expect to obtain the cars when he requests 
them. It seems nearly everyone desires them at the same time. Tile struc-
ture of the transportation industry has forced some elevators to truck 
their grain to terminal elevators rather than perhaps a point of export. 
Tile shortage of cars plus railroad abandonment has created some definite 
obstacles to hedging by a farmer . Pricing policies of the major grain 
firms have changed to take advantage of the car scarcity. If the local 
elevator has several cars available it can receive, say, five cents more 
per bushel than if the grain company purchasing the grain furnishes cars. 
Tile major firms generally have a railroad car fleet already under lease. 
These institutional factors have caused some drastic basis changes . 
There are some real difficulties in hedging but also that is where 
considerable beauty exists under some circumstances. When one decides to 
hedge, perhaps he should record the reasons. Timing is the key no matter 
what strategy is chosen. Ideally, price movement should have reached its 
culmination before one makes his final judgment. Are conditions such that 
this action would be the most advantageous? Tilis is difficult to ascer-
tain, but one has to determine the relevant facts and weigh them in their 
proper perspective. For example, an elevator should survey the railroad 
car availability, the weather forecast, or the grain drying possibilities. 
One should not overlook the nearby obstacles before looking beyond. 
However, for the planning horizon, the decision maker must examine the 
overall picture and place it in its proper dimensions. 
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HEOOING IN THEORY 
Formal hedging in cotmnodities requires the use of futures. A futures 
contract is a forward contract. If one buys a contract, or is long, taking 
delivery becomes a possibility. Price rises offer a profit for "going 
long." When one sells a contract, or is short, delivering the commodity 
becomes a possibility. Price declines give the opportunity for a profit. 
The futures contract specifies the amount, the quality, the place of 
delivery, and the date when it must be in place. The only item that is 
negotiated is the price. 
Hedging offers the opportunity for the owner of commodities to 
transfer some of the price level risks to speculators. Hedgers actually 
own the agricultural commodity or contemplate owning the commodity and 
transfer the price risk to the market. Speculators assume this price 
risk in hopes of a profit. They perform another important function of 
providing liquidity to the market by taking the opposite position of the 
hedgers. It should be noted that a hedge implies equal and opposite 
transactions in the cash and futures market or a futures transaction to 
accompany an anticipated need for the cash at some time in the future. 
One hedges under the assumption that the cash and futures price will come 
together at the date of expiration (if it is not a par delivery point it 
should only differ by transportation). 
Cash and futures prices will be approximately equal at expiration of 
the futures contract because corn is a commodity harvested at one time 
during the year and delivery provisions provide arbitrage. It is gradu-
ally brought out of storage to meet domestic and foreign demand during 
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the rest of the year. In other words, the cash should rise continually 
until the next harvest under normal conditions . Over the years, five 
different months have become standardized by the industry as the contract 
months for corn. Tiley are March, May, July, September, and December. 
Tilese are the critical months in the crop year; for example, in December 
the harvest is completed. 
There are long and snort hedges. Each has definite applications. 
Tile long hedge would indicate a situation where the merchandiser or farmer 
has to procure the commodity to meet a future cash commitment (grain 
export, feed for hogs). The decision maker does not have the commodity 
for a number of reasons. Perhaps there is a desire not to tie up facili-
ties and capital for an extended period of time. Tile hedge would be 
initiated when the future commitment was made. The operator would buy the 
option closest to the commitment he has sold in the cash. In practice, 
this is generally not handled this way due to the narrowing of the basis 
which either causes a loss or results in paying storage charges to some 
other merchant via the narrowing basis (a discussion of the basis will 
follow). 
Tile long hedge does not apply to the heart of the issue that is being 
dealt with here for the major intent is to consider the situation facing 
the grain producer or elevator operator. The short hedge probably has 
more broad applications to farmers and marketing firms and it can be used 
more readily by the farmer or elevator. Most central Iowa operators and 
producers do not involve themselves with export dealings or feed contract-
ing (in futures). The long hedge will not oe considered further in this 
investigation. 
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The short hedge is more generally used. The situation of having to 
contend with price level risk on a stored inventory is frequent. Farmers 
and grain merchants seldom are without some commodity in storage. 
The short hedge would be used when there is a commodity in storage. 
The elevator or farmer has the grain (either bought, raised or planned 
for production) so he is long the cash market. To offset the position in 
the cash, the operator would sell futures in the option closest to the 
time he expects to liquidate his cash position. This decision would be 
influenced by the carrying charge (explained later) which the various 
contracts offered. 
In discussing hedging one would start with the "perfect hedge . " The 
perfect hedge is usually a short hedge in textbooks. Suppose an individual 
owns 5,000 bushels of corn or enough for one futures contract on the 
Chicago Board of Trade. In order to protect himself from a price decline 
he hedges. On February 1 he decides to dispose of his cash grain in March, 
so the hedge is executed in March futures. He is long cash, thus he will 
go short futures. The transaction is shown below as A. 
A. 
B. 
Feb. 1 
Mar. 15 
CASH FUTURE'S 
Buy 
Sell 
5000 bu. 
5000 bu. 
$1.05 
1.00 
$-.05 
Feb. 1 
Mar. 15 
Sell 
Buy 
Net Gain = 0 +.05 + (-.05) 
5000 bu. 
5000 bu. 
$1.25 
1.20 
$+.OS 
On March 15 (B) he decides to sell his corn, so he buys back his 
futures contract . Did h.e lose because the cash price declines? No, 
because he had sold a future contract to guard against a price decline. 
One should note that if the price went up the same amount 
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in the cash and futures market, one would not be able to benefit from the 
price rise. The individual gained in the cash and lost in the futures. 
It is assumed that the cost of trading is zero. In reality there would 
be a brokerage fee plus interest on the margin money. 
A change in the basis occurs when cash and futures do not change by 
an equal amount. The basis is defined as the difference between the 
current cash price and the current futures price. An unequal change 
exemplifies the typical situation. The following example illustrates a 
basis that narrowed: 
A. 
B. 
Oct. 1 
Dec. 1 
Buy 
Sell 
5000 Bu. 
5000 Bu. 
$ • 95 
1.02 
$+.07 
Oct. 1 
Dec. 1 
FlITURES 
Sell 5000 bu. 
Buy 5000 bu. 
Net Gain = 9¢ = 7¢ + 2¢ 
BASIS 
$1.20 
1.18 
$+.02 
$ .25 
.16 
$+.09 
In this situation the hedger captured a gain in both the cash and 
futures markets from the narrowing basis. This is not always the case. 
He may receive a profit overall, if the basis narrows, even though he may 
incur a loss in one market. 
The next example is one of a widening basis on a short hedge. It is 
shown below. 
A. 
B. 
Oct. 1 
Dec. 1 
~ 
Buy 5000 bu. 
Sell 5000 bu. 
$ • 95 
_:J]_ 
$+.02 
FlITURES 
Oct . 1 Sell 
Dec. 1 Buy 
Net Loss = 3¢ = -5¢ + 2¢ 
5000 bu. 
5000 bu. 
BASIS 
$1.15 $ .20 
1.20 .23 
$-.05 $-.03 
As one can see, the widening basis created a loss even though there was a 
gain in the cash market. Actual experience shows that one can profit in 
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one market and lose as an end result. It should be obvious that the net 
gain (loss) can be calculated two ways. The addition of the gains or 
losses in the cash and futures markets or the difference in the buying 
and selling basis. The following equations demonstrate this principle. 
Net Gain (Loss) = Cash Gain (Loss) + Futures Gain (Loss) 
Buying Basis = Cash PriceA - Futures PriceA 
Selling Basis = Cash PriceB - Futures PriceB 
Net Gain (Loss) = Buying - Selling Basis 
The buying basis is the difference that exists between cash and 
futures when the hedge is initiated. The selling basis applies when one 
liquidates his hedge. The hedger attempts to maximize profits by having 
a larger buying basis than his selling basis. The bigger returns are 
derived when th.e difference is larger. 
What should the basis be in a given geographical area? The basis for 
each geographic area is generally recurring and has a historical pattern. 
The basis may be described as representing th-e costs involved to store, 
handle, and transport the grain to or from delivery point of the futures 
contract, but this is not entirely true for basis changes. For this paper 
the delivery point is Chicago. Central Iowa would generally have a cash 
price discounted to the Chicago futures price. The basis for Baltimore or 
New Orleans would generally show cash above futures. The possibility of 
delivery is the factor which makes th.e grain market more perfect with 
respect to time. The basis may be above or below what actual expenses are 
making it more accurate to say that it is a market determined price for 
storage, handling and transportation services. Delivery becomes an attrac-
tive alternative when the basis exceeds the exact costs as an opportunity 
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for profit exists. nus operation is what causes cash and future prices 
to typically converge during delivery months. llle basis should differ by 
no more than transportation costs but it may be less . For example, an 
elevator company may need corn to meet th.e local demand for cattle feed 
in a certain area. Its bid price may suddenly increase (thereby narrowing 
the basis) in order to draw corn to its location. As one can see, local 
supply and demand conditions can have a substantial effect on the basis. 
What other factors can cause the oasis to widen or to narrow? 'lbese 
basis changes can be thought of as the demand for storage (46), the 
transportation available and the flow of cash grain into the market. A 
crop year with abundant production would make storage space scarce. 
Therefore, the elevator operator could widen his buying basis from what 
is considered "normal" or has been th.e historical average for the area. 
In other words, the manager would lower his bid price to producers so the 
basis would be 30 cents rather than 25 cents. A shortage of railroad cars 
or barges might cause the operators to widen the basis also . It should be 
noted that the operator would raise his bid price (narrows his basis) 
until he just fills his warehouse and transportation facilities . Other-
wise he has lost an opportunity for a possible profit. This is difficult 
to project. 
New crop bids by grain merchandisers are pure conjecture early in 
the crop year due to the uncertainty of growing conditions and export 
demand . nte merchandiser would generally initiate his bids using the 
previous fall's basis minus a few cents . '!he few cents are to cover 
the uncertainty. 
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.An astute producer, if he decides to contract his growing crop, will 
bargain on the basis and will contract his crop in this manner. The more 
narrow the basis is, the more the farmer receives. As the crop matures 
and the export demand solidifies, the elevator operator can more nearly 
estimate what the demand will be on his facilities and whether he will be 
able to move tne grain. He then adjusts his bids to adequately reflect 
supply and demand conditions. 
With more farmers increasing production and combining corn rather 
than storing in the ear, more storage and drying facilities are required 
for each year's harvest. The demand for storage has increased prac-
tically every year since the early 1960's. Many producers are relying on 
local elevators to handle this increased capacity. It seems that pro-
ducers are erecting more storage and drying facilities on the farm . The 
strain on the elevator still exists due to the lack of railroad cars. 
Grain has to remain at the elevator longer. Normally, in central Iowa, 
grain merchants s ell and remove many of their soybeans in the short period 
of time before the bulk of corn is delivered. The basis narrows rapidly 
on soybeans and more gradually on corn (5) . With the present day 
transportation difficulties soybeans take up part of the corn space. One 
would do the opposite when cash is above futures. Again, this relation 
between cash and futures at the close of the option depends on the storage 
situation at the delivery point. The different options would generate 
prices higher than cash. prices for they reflect the added costs of storage 
and handling. Under normal conditions one would think of cash rising to 
meet futures. 
One term should be discussed before moving onto the next topic and 
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that is pre-h.edging. This is the word that is sometimes used for initiat-
ing a hedge or selling futures without having the cash connnodity. The 
rnternal Revenue Service recognizes this as a hedge for a farmer when he 
has planted h.is crop . Otherwise, the elevator manager is involving 
himself in speculation, not hedging. The firm has taken an open position 
in the futures mark.et . "Pre-hedging" happens mainly at times when there 
is a large influx of grain, say during the harvest. The grain company 
sells futures during the trading session in anticipation of what will be 
bought later in the day in the cash market. 
Spreads, or the difference between two different options of the same 
or two different commodities, are pertinent to hedging. Of most importance 
is the difference between two different options. Spreading two different 
commodities is not of significance to a farmer or elevator operator . For 
example, a com-wheat spread would offer little opportunity for improving 
the profit potential of the firm unless the firm desires to speculate. 
lhe difference between options of the same commodity is defined as 
the carrying charges. Carrying charges are the costs involved in storage 
of the commodity from the expiration of the nearby option to the next 
option. 1bese costs include storage costs, interest on the capital needed 
to huy the grain, and insurance. 
How would one spread two options of corn? One must remember that the 
basis is of no significance in spreads. The transactions are shown below. 
A. 
B. 
MARIB CORN MAY CORN 
Feb. 1 Sell 
Feb. 25 Buy 
$1 .34 
1.30 
$+.04 
Buy 
Sell 
$1.34 
1.35 
$+.01 
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First one must assume that he is not facing the possibility of a market 
inversion. (A discussion of the inverted market will follow.) If the 
market indicates an intention to move towards full carrying charges, one 
would sell the near-by and buy the distant option. Th.is would indicate the 
"normal" market. One would simply reverse his position to realize a gain 
as shown in the example. Much of the time the spread between options is 
less than carrying charges because if they reach the full amo\lll.t spreaders 
buy the near-by and sell the distant. Enough people conduct this operation 
so that the difference between options is somewhat less than full carrying 
charges. 'llle difference in price between options seldom is greater than 
carrying charges due to the number who will buy the near-by and sell the 
distant. This makes the market more perfect with respect to time. 
What if the difference between options is substantially less than 
full carrying charges or at even money? Th.ere is no barrier as to how 
much the near-by can exceed the distant. Th.is depicts the inverted market . 
The market is saying that it de.sires more grain now and is willing to pay 
a premium to bring it out of storage. This can be exemplified by an 
increase in export demand. Distant months will remain at a discount as 
long as there is increased demand or decreased supplies in the current situ-
ation. The distant futures will fluctuate little as compared to those 
close to expiration. Expectations are that the price will decline to the 
distant discounted prices once the need is filled for the current situation. 
The market then will reflect a premium for storing the commodity. 
'llle inverted market presents a dilemma to a grain company. In this 
time of need for the commodity, one would buy futures and sell "to arrive" 
contracts. "To arrive" contracts are made by a firm that desires the 
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connnodity and it will guarantee a given price if it is at a specified 
location by a designated ti.me. The grain must be of a certain quality. 
The gr ain company would receive less for its conunodity and have more 
expens es by waiting to sell the grain later. 
Spreading is a handy tool to use in conjunction with hedging . 
Suppose the basis in October for the December option is wider than manage-
ment's expectations. The merchant hedges by placing a hedge in the Decem-
ber option. When trading begins in later maturing options, the merchant 
decides to capture more profit by a further narrowing of the basis. After 
deciding which option offered greatest profit potential, the merchant 
spr eads the December option and, say, the July option. When July 
approaches the hedge is closed. The following illustrates the hedge. 
Cash Futures Basis 
Oct. 1 Buy 5000 bu. $1.50 Oct . 1 Sell 5000 bu. Dec . $1 . 75 $ . 25 
Dec . 1 1. 52 Dec . 1 Buy 5000 bu. Dec . 1. 70 . 18 
$+.02 $+.05 $+.07 
Dec. 1 $1. 52 Dec. 1 Sell 5000 bu . July $1.85 $ . 33 
July 1 Sell 5000 bu . 1. 75 July 1 Buy 5000 bu. July 1.87 .12 
$+.23 $- . 02 $+ . 21 
Net Proceeds from hedge = 28¢ 
.As on e can see, this hedge in wheat offers greater opportunities for pr ofit 
due to the extra time for the basis to narrow. These transactions are 
known as moving the hedge forward. Seldom should the decision maker have 
to move the hedge forward. He should try to project the actual sale as 
accurately as possible for this last method often increases expenses. 
One should now understand the theoretical construct of hedging . The 
futur es contract, the basis and the s~read are some of the key factors in 
making beneficial marketing decisions. 
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SURVEY OF RELATED STUDIES 
Richard G. Heifner 
Heifner (17) demonstrated in his investigation the effectiveness of 
hedging corn, oats, red wheat, white wheat, and soybeans in Michigan. His 
primary intent was to determine whether or not hedging reduced risk. The 
marketing years 1952 to 1963 were used. The cash grain prices of Michigan 
were coupled with the appropriate closes of the different futures contracts 
on the Chicago Board of Trade. 
The time period of the investigation stretched from harvest to the 
next harvest with two month divisions for trading. The storage income 
strategies were executed the same way each year. These alternatives were 
compared to the income from remaining open . It was calculated by taking 
the cash price difference at harvest with the cash price at the end of the 
storage period. The income from hedging was the amount that the basis 
narrowed during the duration of the strategy. Interest, commission and 
margin were subtracted from the hedging income. 
The two plans tested were as follows: (a) remaining in a cash posi-
tion and (b) the returns from a short hedge placed in the option nearest 
to the corresponding selling date. 
lbe results demonstrated that during the investigated period for corn 
and soybeans, high storage income one year was followed by menial revenue 
the next year . Corn produced the best returns due to price decline during 
the crop season. Red wheat, white wheat and soybeans donated small, if 
any, earnings from the short hedge. Bull markets persisted in these 
COIIllilodities . Oats provided profits when held until the latter portion of 
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the season . There was a recurrent pattern of a price rise during the first 
months of storage followed by a price decrease . Price movement patterns 
were tested statistically and proved to be seasonal and recurring. 
When considering the risk level (comparing standard deviations) of 
hedging versus not hedging, there was a reduction in risk by hedging . In 
other words, hedging decreases the exposure to price changes . The variance 
in revenue derived from holding soybeans and red wheat was quite large. 
In contrast, corn and white wheat proved to have variances which were 
substantially narrower. Oats fell in between the two extremities but 
tended to be at the less volatile end of th.e spectrum. 
The study further suggests that when hedging one should select a late 
season option when the selling date is not determined. The best approach 
when there exists a confirmed conmdtment for the cash grain is to hedge in 
the option nearest this date. 1hese hedges showed less standard deviation 
than the situation where the selling date is not established. This trend, 
however, was negligible. Th.e results illustrated that average revenues and 
the standard deviation of the revenues changed little from option to 
option. Th.e basis narrowed substantially early in the season then 
approached a constant the remainder of the period . 
In another study, Heifner (18) concentrated on the characteristics of 
the basis in Michigan for corn, soybeans and white wheat. The author 
developed a series of formulas for predicting the basis over different 
storage periods. Through these equations, he hypothesized that storage 
income could be increased by altering storage operations to coincide with 
the estimations. Different, overlapping time intervals were selected for 
comparison in each conunodity. 
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Through use of regression analysis it was concluded that the basis 
decrease was much more predictable than cash price increase. Cash price 
increase from inception of the storage period to end of the storage period 
represented the control strategy in the investigation. There were only two 
times cash price was estimated with greater accuracy than the basis for the 
three commodities. In addition, variance of the basis was less than the 
basis for cash prices. The corn basis proved to be more precisely project-
ed than the basis for white wheat and soybeans from year to year . 
White wheat exhibited a predictable pattern through December. Basis 
change estimates over August 15 to October 15 interval were a failure. The 
estimations for the time period extending into February and April fared 
somewhat better but not substantially. The soybean basis was well explained 
by the model for periods terminating in April. 
In the second division of the investigation, the predicting model was 
employed in decision making for storage of the chosen commodities. Four 
variable storage cost levels were considered ranging from zero to three 
cents per bushel per month. This reflects the economies to scale of 
different operations. The conditional storage rule was contrasted with 
storing each year no matter what conditions prevailed. The storage rule 
was simply that if the predicted revenue exceeded costs at the start, 
then the grain was warehoused during that time interval. If results 
displayed a loss, then the grain was not stored . 
Firms with lower costs naturally would find it beneficial to store 
grain when firms with less efficient facilities had to sell the couunodity . 
Employing the conditional storage rule, average income was increased while 
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costs connected with warehousing declined. Price levels do affect the 
decision making as they tend to increase storage costs. 
During the early part of the crop season, storage revenue exceeded 
variable costs nearly every year for every size firm. The decision rule 
was of little significance. The intervals were 11/ 15 to 1/ 15 for corn, 
8/ 15 to 10/15 for white wheat and 10/ 30 to 12/31 for soybeans. 
The duration following the first designated period required the 
storage rule. Firms with a one cent storage cost for corn could find the 
rule beneficial in January when faced with the prospect of further storage. 
The study suggested average storage revenue could be improved by three 
fourths of a cent per bushel over time while reducing costs at the same 
instant. October and February were the turning points fo r white wheat 
and soybeans, respectively. For these two connnodities long run benefits 
may exceed one cent per bushe l by use of the rule . 
In sunnnary the crop season can be divided into three parts. The first 
section is after harvest when it is nearly always profitable to store. In 
the second division income approximates the variable costs . In the third 
section chances for benefits are about equal to losses. In other words, 
it is a remarkable year when it is worthwhile to warehouse grain for the 
entire season. 
R. W. Wisner 
Wisner (41) suggests seven preliminary steps before the decision maker 
hedges. They are as follows : 
1. Adapt the futures price to the local area 
2. Estimate the probable size of later cash transaction 
3. Determine the possible returns with a hedge 
4 . Survey all the sources of market information especially 
those pertaining to the future situation 
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5. Calculate the benefits without hedging 
6. Compare the returns with and without hedging, and 
analyze one's risk preference 
7. Choose the best alternative 
One must subtract four things to localize the price (Step 1). First 
is the normal basis. '!he second is the quality differential (No. 1 vs . 
No. 2) for it may not coincide with the specifications for a futures 
contract . The last two items to subtract are interest and the brokerage 
fees. This provides the decision process for the operator. 
Gerald Gold 
Gold (12) pointed out some aspects of the grain market which were not 
mentioned earlier. It should be evident that spot (cash) prices and 
future prices of various options do not move up and down by the same amount. 
One can easily find examples of near-by options rising and distant ones 
declining or vice versa. At the same time there are price changes among 
different grades of cash . Sometimes one will find one grade discounted 
more than at other times . Due to the inflexibility in the size of the 
f utures contract, price changes may no t exactly reflect the change of 
value in the hedger's inventory. Actual experience shows that this is a 
common happening . Hedging offers an opportunity to set a price on a 
processed product like flour by using wheat futures. This makes hedging a 
useful tool over a more broad spectrum but this is not the concern of 
this investigation. 
Gold mentions one other idea which might be beneficial in strategy 
formulation . In an inverted market, futures will show more pr ice 
strength than is found in the cash market over time . Cash and futures 
must approach each other at maturity. The discounted distant options 
remain at their levels while the ~ash drops to meet the futures. 
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T. A. Hieronymus 
Hieronymus (20) names four principal ways which farmers can use 
futures to market grain. First, to determine a price before harvest. 
Second, to fix storage income on grain for later delivery. Third, to 
lock-in feed costs without taking delivery. Finally, to speculate i n the 
price of grain which had to be sold due to lack of storage space. The 
last two alternatives can be eliminated . The third because it involves 
a long hedge, and the fourth for it pertains strictly to speculation. The 
first two notions summarize two of the major intents of this research. In 
essence, the main motive is to enable the farmer to realize a greater value 
for his con:nnodity . The author claims that inventory owners are speculators . 
The farmers turn out to be the primary group in this area. 
Hieronymus points out that typically at the expiration of an option the 
cash price exceeds the futures price. This is not a violation of theory. 
The handling charges and quality difference create this aberration. His 
investigation of the basis for corn, soybeans, oats, and wheat covered the 
years from 1955 to 1961. The week to week cash prices were compared to 
two options of futures depending on the commodity. The options were chosen 
so to maintain a hedge year round. 
During the seven years studied by Hieronymus the cash price for corn 
tended to rise during the crop season. The average price increase from 
mid October to July was twenty cents per bushel. Cash and futures prices 
move in the same direction but not by equal amounts. · This accounts for the 
narrowing of the basis. To bring these two facts together, if all buyers 
and sellers are well aware of the supply and demand situations from the 
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beginning of the season with no change then the average variation for 
futures prices would tend to be zero. This would be true for any 
commodity. 
The characteristic corn basis shrank seven cents from planting to 
harvest . It increased about five cents from harvest to spring or summer. 
The average yield increased each year which may be the compensating factor 
for the variation being greater than zero. As the yield increase became 
known the price tended to decline each year. Expectations during the 
first part of the season were the same yield as the previous year . 
He observes that the basis charts for the period are all rather 
similar. The general form for each shows cash prices rising relative 
to futures with stabilization during spring and summer. December and 
July options were utilized for corn . The difference between these two 
options remained constant. It differed more than one cent from the 
average of eleven cents only one time. 
Hieronymus also points out that the December basis at harvest 
fell about ten cents. Each demonstrated some significant differences, 
especially at harvest, when the July basis ranged from fifteen to twenty-
five cents. Nineteen cents was the average basis for July at harvest. 
The basis during the time period prior to harvest is strictly con-
jecture . The basis is founded on expectations of what the crop may be . 
This explains the volatility of the basis from year to year also. It 
should be noted that grain merchants are interested in the relationship 
of cash to futures. When they believe the basis is distorted, merchants 
buy cash grain and sell futures. If the basis differs from harvest 
time , grain merchants have miscalculated the actual conditions. 
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Hieronymus states that storage is fixed for any one crop year. The 
basis should reflect the costs involved in holding the grain for a 
specified period of time. When faced with a short crop, operators will 
accept a smaller basis and not cover full costs rather than have the 
facilities remain empty . 
Weather conditions at harvest may cause the basis to widen. Corn 
with a high moisture content cannot be stored easily unless there are 
drying facilities or it is fed to lives tock . Most producers cannot dry 
the corn as fast as it is combined so it is hauled to the local elevator. 
Even in a short crop year it places an unforeseen stress on facilities 
similar to a large crop. 
He notes that the Chicago basis is generally widest when the crop is 
finally harvested or approximately December 1. The basis during July or 
the end of the storage season is fairly constant . The basis tends to vary 
with the supply and demand conditions at Chicago (par delivery point) . If 
Ch.icago is lacking corn the basis could grow to reflect transportation 
costs. This would attract delivery to Chicago. If stocks in Chicago are 
sufficient then the basis would tend to narrow. 
Hieronymus (20) used a "target price" technique where one establishes 
the pr ice he hopes to receive by subtracting the average basis for a 
particular location from the time in q.uestion . In this instance the time 
is harvest. This translates the futures price to a cash price. If the 
farmer hedges, before planting (on May 2 for corn), he can set the cash 
price within a fairly narrow range of what he will actually receive at 
harvest. The hedge is terminated on October 17. Over the period from 
1955 to 1961 the hedge lost three times and registered a profit four times 
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when comparing the results to the target price. The range from the 
target price minus four and one-fourth to a positive four and one-eighth 
cents. These were narrow misses of the estimated price and gave the 
farmer a method to make judgment on what he will receive. 
The average harvest basis in this example was eighteen cents. If 
December futures were selling for $1.50 on May 2, then it would be trans-
lated into a harvest cash price of $1.38. This is what the market is 
predicting considering the current situation. The market is also 
guaranteeing the producer at least $1.50 if the grain is delivered to 
Chicago. If the farmer concludes that this is an adequate price he 
sells futures. Assume that by December the futures have declined to 
$1.40 with a local cash price of $1.19. With the ten cents profit in 
the futures he receives $1.29 or on 5,000 bushels $500.00 more than 
remaining open. Connnission and interest need to be subtracted to obtain 
the net gain. 
With the fixed liquidation date it is difficult to attain the 
target price. If it was variable, with liquidation occurring when the 
basis is 18 cents, profits would be improved. 
According to the results it was profitable to exercise this method 
each year. However, increasing production existed each season. In the 
long run, profits would probably equal losses. If the producer includes 
his judgment in decision making he may find this procedure meaningful . 
Hieronymus analyzes the farmer's situation. He f aces two courses of 
actiou at planting--contracting or hedging in futures. Hedging offers a 
higher average forward price (the farmer has the full advantage of basis 
• 
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change) and more flexibility. Say the basis falls to twelve cents due 
to growing conditions. He may, prior to harvest, close out his futures 
contract and be long cash. If price rises and the farmer contracted he 
cannot get out of his position as easily. Contracting benefits the 
farmer in these ways --a fixed price, no margin money, and less than 5000 
bushel lots . This example illustrates the idea of the "blind hedge" at 
planting which proved to be of little benefit. 
Hieronymus considers another aspect of value to the farmer. It is 
establishing storage income. The "target price" technique is employed 
again . The normal basis at delivery for the latter part of the season 
for East Central Illinois averaged eight cents for years involved in 
this investigation. The storage interval began on October 17 and finished 
on July 1 of the same crop season. If the farmer was content with the 
derived cash price he sold as much corn on the futures as was in storage . 
On July 1 he sold cash grain and covered his short position. 
The deviation from the projected price for corn ranged from $. 04 7/8 
below to $.03 above. As one can see , the basis forecast was fairly close 
even though price levels changed drastically as in the case of soybeans . 
Corn was on the plus side of the forecast twice, broke even once , and 
demonstrated a minus outcome four times. 
Again the farmer must contemplate what the local elevator will pay at 
completion of the time period considered . For the most part it is specula-
tion. 
This technique offers producers an opportunity to profit from storing 
grain on their premises. If at harvest the farmer decides the price is 
adequate and he is pessimistic toward price increases, should he sell his 
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corn? He will not attain any earnings from his storage facilities until 
the crop is harvested again. This method allows him to receive the price 
he desired plus storage income. If the producer sells his grain it is 
final and leaves him inflexible. In other words, by using futures the 
decision maker can change his mind if there is a substantial change in 
the basic supply or demand situation. 
'lll.e study went further to combine the planting and the harvest hedges. 
December futures were sold at planting, lifted and the hedge reestablished 
in the July contract after August 1 and before November 14 of the current 
growing season whenever the spread was ten cents. If ten cents was not 
attained the hedge was forwarded to July on November 14 . When the July 
basis reached eight cents the short position was covered and the cash 
grain was sold. The final date for closing the transaction was July 3. 
The results, when comparing final price to the basis projection, gave 
an actual price to be above that from the basis projection four times, 
below twice and equal once. They ranged from a profit of one and one- half 
cents to a loss of two and five-eighths cents . One would conclude from 
examining the results that over time returns would equate to the exact 
target price. Deviations from the target can be explained by having to be 
satisfied with less than a ten cent spread between December and July 1 and 
having to close at less than eight cents basis in July. Hieronymus further 
suggests that these aberrations might have been reduced if daily prices 
were used rather than weekly prices. lbis could explain misses throughout 
the entire study. 
Hieronymus (19) proposed a thought which startled many but is very 
significant. His claim is that hedging should be defined as speculating 
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on the basis . By hedging, one transfers the risk from a cash position to 
a bas is position. Thie attitude is difficult for some to cope with but it 
does deserve some th-0ught. He mentions that the width of the basis should 
be considered the demand for storage. In big crop years it will be 
greater than during seasons of low production. The basis is the widest at 
harvest. It narrows rapidly as stored grain begins to be sold. The writer 
explains that apreads are determined by the situation at the delivery 
point . This phenomena determines whether or not the market pays full 
carrying charges. During years of little off-farm movement of grain the 
basis tends to be more narrow. When the producers sell at harvest it 
seems to be wider. 
Hieronymus compared cash market relationships. He noted that Omaha 
and Kansas City cash corn began at premiums to Chicago cash corn and 
ended the seasons at discounts . He concluded the reason for the rela-
tionship change was the CCC corn movement during the period studied. 
Virgil A. Wiese 
Wiese (Chicago Board of Trade, 5) presented a fascinating merchandis-
ing strategy for the grain storage business. He explained that for ele-
vator s in his area corn and soybeans were the major products. Soybean 
harvest on the whole was usually complete thirty days before the major 
influx of corn . His firm started moving soybeans out of their facilities 
rather quickly for most of the merchandising margin (bas is change) was 
gained in that short period . The elevator would then prepare for incoming 
corn because the return was greater over time for storage of corn than 
soybeans because they could capture another rapid basis improvement . 
Other producing areas might have shorter or longer s t orage periods for 
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soybeans. He mentions that elevator operators would only hedge in 
November soybeans if they contracted with producers in late summer. Some 
elevators get high utilization of storage space if they are in the proper 
location. Wiese reports that in areas where wheat is also grown it should 
be liquidated in October to prepare for soybeans. 1hus, there is triple 
use of storage space and a capturing of three rapid basis changes. In 
general, an elevator operator should attempt to purchase corn at the 
pinnacle of harvest. 
When placing a hedge at harvest, Wiese recommends avoiding the 
inverse markets. For example, if May wheat is selling at a discount to 
March, it would be best to hedge in March. If there is an adequate 
reflection of carrying charges in the market (May above March), one would 
use the faraway option. One may even consider July in corn. 
Truman F. Graf 
Graf (15) investigated hedging during 1949 through 1951, a period of 
war and peace. He evaluated cash and futures for four, eight, and sixteen 
week periods. Data for the study were based on each week's Friday closes 
of futures and cash (sometimes nominal) from the Chicago Board of Trade. 
He surveyed corn, wheat and oats. Soybeans were omitted due to lack of 
cash quotations and because they were thought to be too speculative. The 
two major thrusts of the study were (a) an analysis of the desire for 
hedging and (b) an analysis of the effectiveness of hedging . 
Hedges were placed in the near-by option where there were eight 
weeks prevailing prior to expiration. For example, an elevator operator 
on April 8, 1950 would hedge in July corn rather than May corn. 
Graf first studied cash price variability. He discovered that corn 
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price changes of $.10 or greater occurred 13 percent of the time during 
the four week time periods, 28 percent for eight week periods and 34 per-
cent on sixteen week periods. Of these changes, the price increased 59 
percent of the time during the four week intervals, 62 percent during the 
eight week periods and 73 percent over sixteen week periods. If a going 
concern had remained in a cash position at all times it would have bene-
fited for the most part. However, losses might have taken place at the 
same time which would have caused the firm to go under. 
Graf (15) considered the effectiveness of hedging. Tite effectiveness 
was determined by the monetary outcome of short basis hedgers (sell cash -
buy futures) and long basis hedgers (buy cash - sell futures). By his 
definition the effectiveness of hedges should reduce profits as well as 
losses to long basis hedgers. If benefits to long basis hedgers had not 
declined, then short basis hedgers were left vulnerable . When the long 
basis hedger gained, the short basis hedger would lose and vice versa. If 
a grain merchant remained in a cash position, his losses or gains would 
equal cash price change. Assume cash price fell ten cents. Had he hedged 
his loss would be two cents and the hedger would be considered 80 percent 
effective . A four cent loss produces 60 percent effectiveness . To further 
designate effectiveness, long and short basis hedgers must be researched . 
While cash price declined, futures remained constant . For the short basis 
hedger, it constituted a ten cent profit. Tite long basis hedger was hit 
with a 10 cent loss. This hedge was not effective at all as neither bene-
fited (as measured by how much profits were reduced or increased). To 
have 100 percent effectiveness, the long and short hedgers should not 
receive a gain or a loss. 
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Results of effectiveness of corn hedging during the three-year period 
illustrated it was effective approximately 27 percent of the time. Each 
year was separated into quarters. The July-August- interval in 1950 proved 
to be disastrously ineffective which lowered the average significantly. 
1he May-June quarter displayed the most consistent effectiveness. Hedging 
effectiveness increased with a reduction in price support activity. 
'llle number of hedges during the three year period with a high degree 
of effectiveness increased from 1949 to 1951. 'llle average effectiveness 
of the hedges remained the same. nus indicates that ineffectiveness of 
of ineffective hedges apparently declined rather than hedging effective-
ness climbing. Of the hedges in the study only 70 percent were effective 
in 1951 but one-fourth of these were less than 50 percent effective. 
Graf concluded that hedges were effective when they needed to be (big 
cash price moves) and ineffective for small moves. He noted that the net 
profit margin for elevators in 1939 was 1.33 percent of sales for small 
grains. Corn price decreases of 2 . 63 percent were not removed even with 
effective hedges. 111.e price change not covered by hedging averaged 3 .33 
percent. In both these cases it exceeds the 1939 benchmark substantially. 
In summary he suggested that hedging is imperative as nearly 40 per-
cent of the time during eight week periods for 1949-51 price declined for 
corn, wheat and oats an average of over seven cents. A firm cannot incur 
losses of this magnitude for long without compensating price risk. He 
points out that cash price decreases and futures price increases happened 
more often than futures declines coupled with cash price increases. 
Overall the cash price change as a percent produced a mean of 5.2 
percent for the three years. Hedging eliminated 1.8 percent for the three 
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gains leaving 3.4 percent unprotected price risk. The effectiveness of 
the hedges during the major swings compensated for these figures. 
When the decision maker (long basis hedger) was faced with a large 
negative basis (futures under cash), he incurred larger losses gaining 
little insurance from price risk. '!he greater the basis the less effective 
the hedge. In general, it was best to hedge in the near-by or second near-
by options only if futures were not greater than cash by more than five 
cents at the initiation of the hedge. If these barriers were established 
53 percent of the price change risk was eliminated. When futures were over 
five cents in either direction from cash it was best not to hedge. 
Holbrook Working 
Working (47) analyzed the price of storage by studying the inter-
temporal price relations. 1bis relationship is defined as a comparison 
of prices which are applicable to different times. It may refer to the 
relation of a spot to a futures price or between two forward prices of 
the same commodity. An example would be May and July corn . 
He suggested that for corranodities which are harvested at one time a 
profit is needed for it to be stored for later use. He states that the 
difference between prices for two different delivery dates for one 
commodity reflects the cost of storage. When abundant supplies exist 
December wheat can be expected to be above May wheat by carrying costs. 
Storage costs are competitively established . Supply and demand will 
dictate the charges. Bumper crops will dictate the costs of storage to be 
above actual cost. Scarcity will induce a less than actual storage cost 
situation. Elevators were pitted against each other for available grain 
in both situations. However, competition was much more fierce during a 
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sparse crop causing decision makers to raise cash bids in order to fill 
their facilities. Inter-temporal price relation explains price oehavior. 
At this point only a positive relationship has been considered. An 
occurrence where the faraway futures option is below the price of the 
near-by option in the same crop year signifies negative storage income. 
In other words, the market is wanting the grain to come out of storage. 
Two fallacies to the price of storage theory are mentioned . They are 
as follows: (1) Many who own facilities store grain and do not make 
decisions on the basis of the inter-temporal price relation, and (2) deci-
sion makers who hedge may not recover earnings equivalent to storage costs. 
Translating th.ese tvlo ideas into different terms, one sees the first 
referring to individuals who plan activities without looking at prices. 
The second alludes to those whose expectations overshadow actuality. 
In another study, Working (47) investigated the effectiveness of 
hedging using wheat futures. Re first explores the use of futures by a 
processor. His concern was not storage income but manufacturing profit. 
In fact, little effort is made to ascertain storage earnings . The futures 
represent a substitute for a cash transaction while at the same time 
locking in material costs. It also allows the processing plant to 
continually function as this is a method of attaining raw materials and 
pricing the processed product. 
Hedging provides the mill operator an opportunity to project his manu-
facturing margin by locking in returns from by-products and by locking in 
cost of raw material. Th.e last item makes up the majority of the costs. 
The main point is that forward contracts can be used to establish prices 
for final products at the same time as raw material costs are established 
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lessening the possibility of losses. In essence it reduces risk. The 
decision maker can exercise more freedom in taking action and be more 
competitive in bidding at the marketplace. 
George E. Kreis 
Kreis (26) ~esearched t hre e differ ent hedgi ng operations f easibl e for 
country grain elevators in Iowa. These operations were compared to 
remaining in an open market position . The study covered corn and soy-
bean prices from October 1, 1963 to October 1, 1968. Storage periods of 
15, 30, 60, 120, and 150 days were considered. Chicago Board of Trade 
futures prices were paired with cash grain prices offered to elevators in 
Central Iowa as a foundation for the study. Each option was tested for 
its hedging profitability. 
The first and most widely employed hedging operation discussed was a 
short futures position coupled with purchased grain. A buying basis 
(futures minus cash on the day of purchase) was computed and subtracted from 
the selling basis (futures minus cash on the day of selling). The initial 
basis represented the potential income. The hedging operation was pitted 
against the gains in the cash. The analysis included varying the lengths 
of storage over the five years also. The benefits of both methods were 
formulated into weekly averages for the final comparison. The five corn 
and seven soybean options were used in the hedging portion. 
The second hedging operation investigated was a buying hedge . Elevator 
operators would take a long position in the futures market to offset a 
forward COllllllitment in the cash market to another merchandiser. A basis 
was calculated on the day the sale was confirmed. The basis on the day 
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the cash was purchased was derived and subtracted from the first basis to 
generate the possible benefits. 
The final hedging strategy involves a spread. The warehouseman buys 
the near-by option and sells the faraway . Wh.en the cash grain is pur-
chased, he sells the near-by contract. Re has established his cash grain 
price and locked in storage income for the future. Rieronymus (20) 
recommended January and May options for soybeans. December and July 
options are best for corn. The profits would be computed by adding the 
difference of the cash prices, (buying time and selling) the near-by 
futures prices (price when the spread began minus the futures price at 
purchase of cash), and the faraway futures prices (price when the spread 
began minus futures price at cash grain sale date). 
Kreis concluded that for corn storage for the five year period the 
average gross storage income was higher when comparing hedging to not 
hedging and demonstrated more consistency in earnings (lower standard 
deviation). The last two crop seasons (66-67 and 67-68) proved to be 
the most beneficial years to hedge as the basis followed the predictions 
of theory very closely. 
Surveying the benefits of storing corn over time one discovers in 
general that as days of storage are increased the number of profitable 
weeks of storage declines. It varied immensely from year to year. 
1h.e buying hedge for corn gave rather unpredictable earnings (losses). 
Intermittent checks point out that selling "to arrive" provides less income 
than grain storage. This hedging operation was quite beneficial at times. 
The data were not as extensive for this strategy as for the others. 
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Using the spread that later developed into a hedge was beneficial for 
the warehouseman. The conclusions were founded on spot checks. This hedging 
operation depended on the basis in December and July and whether or not 
the difference between the two options reflected full carrying charges. 
Soybeans displayed less profit opportunities than corn from hedging. 
The selling hedge reduced gross mean earnings but generated a lower standard 
deviation than remaining in the cash. This trend was exhibited on the 
shorter storage lengths. Elevators could realize a greater return by 
storing corn than soybeans. Earnings ranged from substantial profits to 
disasterous losses. 
The second hedging operation (the buying hedge) apparently provided 
a stable trend as one of its merits. The spread showed the most consistent 
results . Profits were derived all five of the years investigated. The 
warehouseman should examine the possibilities of this alternative for better 
returns in the future. 
Kreis reconunended that one might maximize earnings from corn storage 
by turning the inventory often rather than keeping the initial purchase for 
a long period of time. He contended that four bushels of corn each held 
for 15 days might give a higher total gross income than storing one bushel 
for 60 days. The quick turnover generates greater costs in commissions and 
handling which would balance the two alternatives. Storage earnings from 
soybeans follows a similar pattern. 
Kreis strongly suggested that grain merchandisers should concentrate 
on the basis. The decision maker should review the historical pattern 
and the relation of the current basis to the mean. 
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When faced with an exceptionally wide basis the hedger should review 
similar situations of the past. When favorable basis changes are antici-
pated one should hedge. Otherwise, the hedger should remain open. Tile 
author noted that although a hedge reduces risk it does not guarantee 
profits. The basis may not change at all during the entire length of 
storage. 
Henry H. Schaefer 
Schaefer (34) researched the basis of live cattle and live hog 
futures. In addition, he analyzed several hedging strategies and compared 
them to not hedging. The investigation covered the period from 1964 to 
1972 . Live cattle and hog futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange were 
compared to cash price for steers at Omana and butchers at the Chicago-
Peoria terminal . 
Schaefer found that the basis did not demonstrate a recurring pattern 
for either hogs or cattle as occurs in grain. It was found that the cattle 
basis reached its lows in August and October. '!he highs were attained in 
February and December. Furthermore, the October basis tended to decrease 
and approach zero on the final day of trading. 
The basis for hogs proved to be at its low during the August and 
October options. Th.e December option produced the widest basis. The 
June option had the most pronounced peak. The June option was the only 
one which consistently approached zero at expiration. 
Schaefer's hedging plans consisted of two naive and three selected 
strategies . '!he naive methods consisted of (1) not hedging and (2) always 
hedging. Always hedging is interpreted as a hedge placed on the same day 
as the cash purchase or sale. Th.e selected strategies were (3) a 
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futures-forecasted cash price, (4) a Bayesian forecasting model, and 
(5) a ten-day moving average . 
The firs t selected strategy required a forecasting model to project 
a cash price fat the poten t i a l sale date for the finished livestock. If 
the forecasted cash price was exceeded by the target price a hedge was 
placed. The target price is derived by subtracting a constant for loca-
tion from the futures. The constant puts the futures price into meaning-
ful terms for the producer. 
Bayesian decision theory allows one to consider a vast number of 
possibilities. No data are required for this plan. Probabilities are 
es timated by the decision maker for the possible states of nature. The 
objectives of the decision maker are needed as well as the possible pay-
off of each alternative. 
The appropriate decision is chosen by multiplying the probabilities 
and the payoff schedule and then summing over each action. The total is 
an expected payoff. After the decision maker has reviewed his objectives 
the strategy which gives the highest payoff is selected . 'llte ten- day 
moving average is the same as the one used in the author's investigation. 
It is a mecnanical trading strategy developed by Keltner (24). Reviewing 
the trading gystem, one first averages the high, low and close for the ten 
days prior to the current session. These daily means are averaged over 
the ten-day period to give one composite mean. The daily range (high-
low) is averaged also. The buying price is determined by adding the 
average daily range to the ten-day average. nte selling price is found 
by subtracting the daily range from the ten-day average. 
Schaefer tested these hedging strategies over several feeding systems 
42 
which closely resembled those in practice. There were three systems each 
for cattle and hog producers. Th.e first system for cattle was placing 
400-pound steer calves on feed November 15. They were sold on August 15 
with an estimated weight of 1,100 pounds with the grade of choice. The 
second feeding operation began on January 1 with 600-pound yearling 
steers. These were fed until June 15 to approximately 1,100 pounds. The 
third system involved 600-pound steers bought on April 15 and put on pas-
ture for the summer. At summer's end the steers were moved to the feedlot 
with marketing time to be December 15. Approximate weight was 1,100 pounds. 
The first hog feeding system involved placing 40-pound feeder pigs on 
feed on July 1 and selling October 15. The second system had a starting 
time of September 1 with a marketing date of December 15. The final hog 
feeding plan used the period from January 1 to April 15 with April 15 as 
liquidation date. Hogs were finished to an estimated weight of 220 pounds. 
One remaining aspect of hedging is considered in this study. Delivery 
was always a real alternative as producers can easily deliver livestock 
against futures . The net prices from delivering and selling locally are 
compared. 
Surveying the results of the two naive strategies for cattle, Schaefer 
found that remaining in a cash position yielded a higher net mean price. 
The difference of the two plans during the November-August system equaled 
$2.91. The remainder for the January-July was $1.97. Th.e April-December 
period was th.e least with $.60. The variance was always greater for 
remaining open than liedging. Only seven times during the periods investi-
gated did the hedged position generate a greater return. The hedged 
position always produced larger net gains when the cash price decreased 
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during the feeding period. It was generally better to liquidate the 
hedged position than to deliver. 
Looking at the results of the futures-forecasted cash price, one 
finds that for the entire time period of three feeding plans, there were 
only seven hedges. The remaining time periods no hedges were placed. In 
every situation where the plan indicated a hedge it yielded a higher net 
price than not hedging and vice versa. Overall, the mean net price for 
the strategy was $.09 higher than the results of the constant cash position 
and $3.00 above continuous hedging. The variance, however, landed between 
the variances for the cash position and the complete hedge. It was con-
cluded that this selected hedging strategy, the futures-forecasted cash 
price excelled the two naive strategies. 
Moving to the Bayesian strategy, the results simply provided further 
justification to the first selected strategy, the futures-forecasted cash 
price. The results were identical. 
The ten-day moving average involved a number of transactions during 
the feeding periods. However, 45 percent of the time the feeder was in a 
cash position at the termination of the feeding period. Delivery possibili-
ties were eliminated. This selected hedging plan produced a net price 
greater than the net price of a complete hedging. For the January-June 
period, the net hedging price exceeded that of remaining open . The cash 
position for the other two feeding periods returned a higher mean net than 
the ten-day moving average . The average hedging cost increased drastically 
for this trading system. The ten-day moving average mean net price and the 
variance fell between the two naive strategies two of the three feeding 
periods. The net price for the January-June period excelled the cash 
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return by one cent. Th.e April-December variance rose above the cash 
position by 3g cents . 
Only once, considering the three feeding systems for all strategies, 
was it unnecessary to deposit more margin . Forty-fiv~ percent of the time 
the feeder needed twica the initial margin . Forty-one percent of the time 
total margin requirements reached three times th.e initial margin. 
Additional capital is definitely needed to hedge. Less margin was needed 
with the first two selected hedging strategies. 
Schaefer (34) found that two of the three hog feeding systems 
generated a high.er mean net price for not hedging. The January-April 
feeding period produced a net price $.40 higher by hedging . The open 
position proved to be $ .39 higher for the July-October period and $1.55 
higher for the September-December period. The variance was less f or 
hedging except for the January-April system . One can see that a higher 
net mean price gave a larger variance. Routine hedging failed to guard 
the hog feeder against a price decline as well as it did the cattle 
feeder. When liquidating it was generally more profitable to deliver. 
Examining the results of the futures-forecasted cash price plan, we 
see th.ere were only six hedges. There was delivery in four of these 
cases. This strategy fell short of the cattle results. Twenty-five 
percent of the time it indicated the wrong action . This trading plan 
provided a higher net mean price than routine hedging in every case . 
The gain ranged from $ .50 to $1.45. When compared to remaining open, 
the selected strategy produced a greater return in two of the three hog 
feeding systems. The September-December cash position was above the 
futures-forecasted cash price plan . 1h.e variance of this selected 
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hedging system fell between the variances of the hedged and nonhedged 
positions. 
Th.e Bayesian strategy produced identical results to the first 
selected strategy for hogs just like in cattle. The ten-day moving 
average hedging plan tended to have outcome characteristics similar 
to cattle. Redges were placed and lifted a number of times. The hog 
feeder was in a cash position 47 percent of the time at liquidation. 
This situation eliminated the possibility of delivery. 
The ten-day moving average mechanical hedging operation returned a 
higher net mean price than either of the naive strategies except for the 
September-December period. The first two selected strategies exceeded 
this mechanical plan on the average for all feeding systems in the studied 
period. The variance was rather volatile ranging from the second smallest 
to second largest of all strategies for all cases. Average hedging costs 
were much greater than those of any of the other strategies. 
The capital needed for hedging hogs tended to be less than required 
for hedging cattle. In twenty percent of the cases only initial margin 
was needed to maintain the routine hedge. Twenty percent of the time, 
however, three times the initial margin was required to maintain a hedged 
position. The average maximum investment declined when employing the 
futures-forecasted price and Bayesian plans. Many times no hedges were 
placed. The ten-day moving average strategy required that additional 
margin be deposited only once. Th.e additional amount totaled $52 . 00. 
Otherwise initial margin was sufficient. 
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PROCEDURE 
The objective of this investigation is to evaluate alternative deci-
sion rules for marketing grain with emphasis on use of futures markets for 
hedging purposes. The outcome of these rules will be compared to several 
strategies for marketing corn at given times. Also, comparisons will be 
made with reconnnendations made in extension outlook newsletters and farm 
periodicals. 
Futures price charts are widely used for speculative and hedging 
trades in the grain industry. The most common types of charts are the (a) 
bar and (b) point and figure charts. Bar chart followers recognize cer-
tain patterns and formations which they believe to be signaling market 
events. A certain "feel" for the market is required to interpret these 
charts and interpretation still relies to some extent on subjectivity . 
Point and figure charts have more definite rules for entering and leaving 
the market. Some traders rely entirely on charts and some use a combina-
tion of charts and conventional fundamental analysis. It should be noted 
that with either type of chart the usefulness varies considerably from 
conunodity to commodity. Certain formations for soybeans are generally 
believed to occur more frequently and are thought to have more prediction 
reliability than the same patterns for live cattle. One simply needs to be 
aware of these idiosyncrasies for each individual commodity . 
The foundation of this study is the cash and futures prices. Futures 
prices (open, high, low, close) were gathered through the help of Conti-
nental Grain Company (9) providing a computer tape of some of the price 
series with the remainder coming from the Wall Street Journal (10). The 
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corn futures on the Chicago Board of Trade are most generally used by 
producers and grain companies of the area. The cash prices came from the 
Des Moines Register and Tribune (4). They are bids to farmers by central 
Iowa elevators. The cash price was reported in a range so the midpoint 
was chosen to facilitate calculations. The set of prices employed in 
this study start on January 2, 1962 and end on December 31, 1973. 
The cash price is one that producers face. Local grain companies 
are quoted a higher price when they merchandise the grain. In order for 
warehousemen to realize the benefits of these strategies they must add 
the average margin per bushel of corn to the cash prices used here. 
Several assumptions need to be designated at this point . Car rying 
costs (interest, insurance and storage) fluctuated widely during the period 
of consideration. They were fairly stable until the late 1960 ' s and 70 's. 
With huge exports , disastrous harvest conditions, high interest rates, 
railroad car shortage plus the energy crisis during the 1970's, carrying 
charges skyrocketed to unbelievable levels. As the price of grain rises 
so does this cost . In addition to the high price of grain, interest rates 
have also risen to new levels in the recent past. For the most part, 
there were few wide aberrations in the interest rate during the 1960's. 
Therefore, the carrying costs for most of the 1960's were stable . These 
costs are incorporated into the models for the entire period . An eight 
percent rate of interest persisted for most of the period. This r ate will 
be used for this study. Admittedly, the rate was higher and lower than 
the one chosen, but the author feels the rate is indicative of the normal 
situation for the period. 
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The initial margin varied with the volatility of the market. As 
prices jumped so did the initial margin. Of course the hedging margin 
is lower than the initial margin required by speculators. These two 
margins are directly related and moved in unison in either direction. 
The exact hedging margins required of the standard 5000 bushel contract 
over the designated time period can be found in the Appendix (Table Al) . 
The exact hedging margin was used and was maintained daily . If pr ofits were 
accrued, it was withdrawn and invested at a rate of eight percent. The 
opposite takes place when losses occur. Interest costs are an important 
factor in futures market operations as it is assumed that the margin money 
is a loan. If this be so then one must look at opportunity costs. By 
switching the margin requirements and carrying costs continuously to reflect 
reality throughout the investigated period would complicate the simulation. 
The results can be easily adjusted for these deviatians. 
The commission is always deducted in futures trading at the termina-
tion of the transaction. It is subtracted from the remaining margin. 
The commission has risen over the time period being considered. The rate 
in the simulation model will change to reflect the changes. The amount 
paid for conmission could arise to be a major factor in some of the 
trading plans as they require a number of entries and exits. 
A major assumption which is imperative to the whole study is that 
market orders, as designated by the models, are executable at that price 
or in the near vicinity . It is difficult to r ep licate actuality in these 
circumstances. It requires personal judgment that a computer cannot 
donate. The most delicate event to program is transaction execution during 
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a limit move. Often when the market surges and one is in a losing position , 
it can be several trading sessions before one can close out the position. 
It may be advantageous to develop strategies for the two different 
situations that have existed in the corn market during this study in the 
corn market. It seems that the data set would break easily into the two 
categories . However, it is more advantageous to have plans which can be 
useful in any market. 
One item which will be included to reflect reality is the change in 
the daily trading limit. Limits are specified as to how far the price 
for any one connnodity can move during a trading session . These are 
imposed by the exchange. Limits exist to enable traders some time to 
reevaluate the market. Sometimes the price is allowed to fluctuate as 
much as it can when the option is near expiration or there is a drastic 
change in fundamental conditions. Almost always there is a limit . Once 
the price hits the limit either up or down, trading activity generally 
declines. The reason being that those on the profitable side of the 
market believe the price will continue to move favorably and do not want 
to liquidate their positions. Those losing stay in the pits desiring to 
trade while the others exit. The limit has undergone one change . It 
mounted to ten cents from eight cents (30) on June 1, 1973. For most of 
the period eight cents was the effective trading limit . 
Before dwelling on the mechanical strategies, real world practices need 
to be discussed to see what producers or elevator operators may actually do. 
Actual experience shows there are four possibilities . It is assumed that 
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the decision maker empties his facilities of the grain by the expiration 
of the crop season. 
One practice is to sell at harvest. This may be caused by lack of 
facilities or simply tradition. The next alternative which arises is 
selling randomly. The major justification for this is that producers 
will liquidate due to some cash need. An example may be a mortgage or 
feed payment. 
The producer is confronted with two reasons for employing the futures 
market. One strategy refers to the necessity to cover production costs 
due to the level of risks carried by the producer. To cover these risks a 
hedge may be placed at planting time by selling a December futures. The 
elevator operator would perform a similar transaction if a farmer con-
tracted for harvest delivery. The hedge is lifted on December 1. The 
cash grain is sold on the same day. The second relates to the desire for 
storage income. This need for profits by the producer from storage equal s 
that of the elevator operator. This hedge is designated as a transaction 
initiated on December 1 for July delivery. The alternative is consummated 
on July 15 with the cash disposed of locally. 
Basis charts show that most of the basis gains are incurred by March 
1. However the March basis is included in the July basis. All hedges are 
executed on the close of the designated day. If the stated day is not a 
working day, the trade is made on the following business day. 
The two blind hedging operations can utilize a variation, which in-
volves terminating a hedge when a substantial loss has been accumulated. 
Most hedgers are not die-hards. Producers tend to fall into this category. 
Rational decision-makers will close out the futures transaction before the 
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hedging loss wipes out a potential profit. One major determining factor 
may be the restrictions on credit. One may be forced to relinquish his 
position. It will be assumed that for this study that 10 percent of the 
hedged price is the reasonable limit for a l oss on blind hedges. The hedge 
is consurmnated at the hedged price plus 10 percent. Once the hedge is 
ended, the corn is stored until the designated cash selling date. 
While two of these alternatives may typify actions of producers more 
than elevator operators, they can be translated for the latter group also. 
The strictly cash grain operations can be thought of as buying cash and 
innnediately selling "to-arrive." Hedging possibilities are easily employed 
by both groups. The net returns for each naive strategy (including the 
harvest and planting hedges without the ten percent stop-loss) will be 
analyzed using the F-test. The returns will be ranked using the method 
of least significant differences (35) if the F-test detects a significant 
difference among the means. 
Proceeding into the heart of the investigation each proposed marketing 
strategy will be tested throughout the designated time period. Simulation 
models will be run on the computer. An attempt will be made to modify each 
strategy in order to improve its usefulness . However, each alternative 
will be allowed to stand or fall on its own merits before and after 
adjustments. The marketing alternatives are as follows: (a) basis change, 
(b) three-point reversal method , (c)_ simple moving average, (dl major price 
trend directional indicator, (e) exponential smoothing, and (f) trailing 
stop. Outlook and other farm publication suggestions will be compared 
to the other alternatives. 
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The buying basis should be as large as possible. When closing the 
transaction one wants a small selling basis. The basis would generally 
reach its maximum sometime during harvest. It would continue to narrow 
as the season expired up until the next year's crop was ready for harvest 
at which time it would widen. The basis follows a recurring pattern and 
tends to approximate the same difference at comparative stages of the 
crop year. It may be positive or negative depending on location. If the 
basis is less than the historical average it may be advantageous not to 
hedge. A study of basis patterns for a number of years indicates that 
there are occasionally substantial departures from the average which 
offer profit opportunities to owners of inventories. It appears that 
there is a substantial increase in the basis at higher grain prices. 
Carrying costs are greater and so are the risks. Elevator operators 
establish bids to protect their position. 
Prudent hedgers need to know their basis. A strategy formulated for 
making decisions based on basis changes was derived by calculating an 
average daily basis and standard deviation of the basis for the entire 
period. These daily figures were converted into weekly averages to 
eliminate the effects of highly unusual events. Normal distribution is 
assumed for the basis for any given time period. The strategy commences 
on October 1 as elevators begin buying corn at that time from farmers who 
have started harvesting. The hedging decision is based on the relation of 
the current basis to the weekly average. When the basis is average or 
less one remains open. If the basis is wider than normal one also 
refrains from hedging as it may widen further. As long as the basis 
continues to widen one profits by remaining open. When the basis narrows 
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by one standard deviation from a previous peak a hedge should be executed. 
The position is maintained until the basis begins to widen by one current 
standard deviation from its lowest point. Once this happens the hedge is 
closed out. 
Looking at the basis change strategy as a series of equations they 
would be as follows: 
DB > AWD 
DB = AWD 
DB < AWD 
DB = DB maximum - AWSD 
DB = DB minimum + AWSD 
Remain open 
Remain open 
Remain open 
Hedge 
After hedging, liquidate at this level, 
where DB means daily basis, AWD is the average weekly basis for the 
investigated period and AWSD is the average weekly standard deviation. 
This mathematical explanation constitutes the first strategy. 
Futures charts are tools which attain their reliability from the 
fact that those who trade watch them with intense interest. They all 
supposedly abide by the same rules. There is generally little if any 
economic justification for their methods. It is the major method for 
technical analysis. The bar charts as previously mentioned involve too 
much subjective judgment. See Figure la for an example of a bar chart. 
The horizontal axis is time and the vertical axis shows the prices. The 
vertical mark indicates the range of that trading session while the 
horizontal slash demarcates the close. 
Point and figure charts are much different (47, 48, 49). They consist 
of a graph of X's and O's. The vertical axis again is price and time 
adjusted to the trading range which lies on the horizontal axis. Whether 
an X or 0 is marked on the chart is determined by examining the high or the 
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TIME 
Figure la. An example of a bar chart for live hog futures 
TIME 
Figure lb. An example of a point and figure chart 
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low of the trading range. It is claimed that point and figure charts 
paint a clearer picture of the prices. Each box represents two cents when 
constructing a corn chart. Therefore only the significant moves are de-
tected and the smaller ones are ignored. The price changes used varies 
with the conunodity charted. 
The trading range must cover three or more boxes before any change 
is made in the chart. If the close exceeds the midpoint of the range X' s 
are put in the three or more boxes. If the close occurs below midrange O's 
are placed in the boxes. For example, if December corn climbed from $2 .80 
to $2.85 during the session finishing at $2.84, three X's would be placed 
in the boxes . If the close was $2.81 O's would be placed in the boxes . 
If the range fails to span three boxes dots are placed in the region 
as a reminder for the coming trading session. If the next day's price ex-
ceeds the previous day's price the dots are erased and X's are sub-
stituted for the entire two day range. If the next day produces a lower 
price entering the immediate lower box, O's replace the dots. If the 
example had shown corn moving from $2.80 to $2 .83 dots would be penciled 
in the area. On the next day if the price rose to $2.85, the boxes would be 
Xed and the dots removed. If the price declined to $2.79 the dots would be 
erased and O's would be drawn in the region. 
The following procedure would be used to chart the next day's range. 
Assuming the column is X's, the high would be surveyed first . If the top 
price enters a higher box they would be Xed in. As long as the daily high 
requires one to draw another X then the low is not considered . At some 
point the bull market will recess and the possibility for placing new X's 
in the column ends. When this event takes place, switch to the lows. If 
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the bottom price in the daily range is below the highest X by the value of 
three boxes (or six cents for corn), the price surge would &e declared to 
be terminated. A column of O's would be started to the right of the first 
which would be one box below the highest X. 
Suppose that the value of corn jumped to $2.90 and the boxes were Xed 
accordingly . Th.ere would be a column of X's stretching from $2.80 to 
$2.90. The following session prices range from $2.84 to $2.91. There is 
a failure to enter a new box so the low must be investigated. Trades were 
made three boxes below the previous high as a column of O's begins to the 
right one box below the high.es t Xed box attained. 
It should be noted that this is the "three point reversal method" as 
nothing on the chart is changed until the low has declined at least six 
cents (three boxes). In essence, it stands unchanged until there is a 
significant move. 
The method used for the bear market is reversed from the one used for 
a hull market. The lows become an indication rather than the highs. Each 
day's low is considered to determine if O's can be placed in new boxes. 
When one is unable to mark a new box the high is automatically the decision 
variable. If the high is three boxes or more above the lowest 0 in the 
previous column a turnaround may have taken place. Nothing is done if it 
fails the test. A reversal has occurred if the test is passed. A new 
column of X's is one box higher than the bottom of the 0 column. The 
sample chart which illustrates the example discussed can be found in 
Figure lb. 
How are trades initiated? A speculator would buy at the moment the 
new row of X's exceeds the next closest row of X's to the left &y one box. 
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This buy signal also represents the price at which short positions should 
be liquidated. In other words, it is a stop-loss if one has sold. The 
example which indicates the inception of a long position can be found in 
Figure 2A. 
The signal to go short is obtained from the bottom of the columns. 
One surveys the lowest box of O's to the right. As soon as the new column 
plunges below the old column next to it, sell. Again it is a stop-loss 
for terminating a long position. A chart which exemplifies the above 
discussion will be found in Figure 2b . 
This strategy allows one to hedge by using the sell signals and to 
liquidate at the buy signals (stop-loss). In essence, the prospective 
hedger remains open when price rises and enters the market on price 
declines. This is one alternative strategy which would be easy to 
implement due to its simplicity. 
The third trading strategy is known as the ten-day moving average 
rule (24). It is easily applied with some simple calculations. It 
involves the average daily price and the range averaged over ten days. 
A hedging price is determined from these two figures. To select the 
hedging price, sum the high, low and close and divide by three. This 
is the daily average price. To attain the average price for the moving 
average, add the daily average prices of the previous ten days and 
divide by ten. The daily range is the difference between the high and 
low. Tii.e daily ranges are averaged over the same ten days. The 
following equations illustrate the method. 
PRICE 
PRICE 
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TIME 
Figure 2a. An example of a buy signal on a point and figure 
chart 
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Figure 2b. An example of a sell signal on a point and figure 
chart 
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10 
L: DA/10 DMA 
i=l 
10 
E (H-L)/10 =DR 
i=l 
Where H is the high, L is the low, C is the close, DA is the daily 
average, DR i s the daily range and DMA is the daily moving average. 
Initiation of either a long or short position is executed in the 
fo l lowing manner. The daily range is added to the daily moving average . 
This es t ablishes the price at which a long position is taken. Likewise , 
subtracting the daily range from the daily moving average establishes the 
point for beginning a short position. Algebraically, 
DMA +DR = BP 
DMA DR SP 
where BP is the buying price and SP is the selling price. 
Objec t ives for the forthcoming trading day are then as follows : (1) If 
the price hits one of these values, an appropriate position is taken 
according to the indicated stop. (2) If one were long, one would only 
observe the selling price to liquidate the long position and possibly go 
net short. If one were short, one would exercise the opposite position. 
For the purposes of this investigation the concern is the value for go i ng 
short . A hedger would go short when the selli ng price is attained , end 
his commitment when the price climbs to the buying price and remain open 
until the selling price is reached again. The buying price is the stop-
loss when one has sold. 
The da ily moving average and the daily range for the pr evious ten days 
are recalculated after the totals are available from the current trading 
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session. The ten most recent market sessions are always incorporated into 
the trading plan. In other words at the end of each trading session the 
moving average is refigured. 
The simple moving average is an uncomplicated mathematical formula 
which levels off the prices by toning down the wide aberrations. The 
fourth strategy is a variation of the previous one. It is a weighted 
moving average. It uses the basic principle of the last plan plus a number 
of variations. To simplify the plan, for use in a highly volatile market, 
the near-by days compose a greater portion of the average than the distant 
ones. The second simplification to enhance understanding pertains to the 
number of days included in the average. As daily trading range enlarges, 
fewer days are needed in the calculations. This one is titled the Major 
Price Trend Directional Indicator (37). 
The simple moving average gives each d-ay equal weight. There are a 
large number of variations of moving averages of which these two appear 
to be representive. To implement the weighted moving average, one first 
tests the daily trading range. It should be understood that the market 
being considered should have at least two ten percent price swings during 
the season. During a calm market for corn a one to two cent average 
daily trading range (for five to ten tradings sessions) would be typical. 
The number of days in the average is increased when the average daily 
range climbs to a certain established level. The calculations for the 
weighted moving average in a tranquil market would encompass twenty-five 
days. The oldest five day's closes would be multiplied by one. The days 
from six through ten are doubled. The period from eleven to fifteen are 
tripled with the days extending f~om sixteen to twenty quadrupled. The 
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most current five days are multiplied by five. Tiiese multiplications are 
summed and divided by seventy-five (the sum of the multiplication factors) 
to ascertain the figure that guides decision making. Seventy-five repre-
sents the total of the adding of factors in the directional indicator. 
An example may be useful to demonstrate the relative simplicity of 
the strategy. Five days will be adequate for our example. Assume the 
closes each day for corn for one week were as follows: $3.22; $3.32; 
$3 . 35; $3.31; and on the last day $3.33. The most recent day receives the 
most weight . Tiierefore, $3.33 would be multiplied by five. Tiiirty-three 
percent weight is placed on the last day. 'llle remainder of the procedure 
is shown below. 
Monday 1 X 3.22 = 
Tuesday 2 X 3.32 = 
Wednesday 3 X 3.35 = 
Thursday 4 X 3.31 = 
Friday --2. X 3.33 • 
15 
$3.22 
6.64 
10.05 
13.24 
16.65 
$49. 80 
lhe factors are added to total fifteen. Tiie factor total is divided 
into the sum of the weighted closes. Tiie answer ($3.2,5%) is the marker 
for implementation of Major Price Trend Directional Indicator (MPTDI). 
Once the decision making price is fixed, a speculator watches for a 
jump of three cents ab.ave the set price during the trading session for a 
signal to buy. A short position would be initiated at three cents below 
the benchmark. In the example, one would purchase a contract at $3.2~ 
and sell at $3.2~. If neither of these objectives is reached, the 
formula is reworked dropping the oldest day and including the current 
expired session. The nE!flr answer sets guidelines for the next day's 
action. The same rules are applied as signals to trade. 
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The fifth trading scheme to be investigated is of a different nature 
than the previous two schemes, but again the basic principle of remaining 
open on price increases and going short on declines is used. The tee~ 
nique is termed exponential s moothing (31) . It is a variation of a 
moving average. 
NM = OM + C(P - OM) 
Where NM is the new moving average, OM is the old moving average, C is the 
smoothing constant and P is the current closing futures price. 
The smoothing constant, c, is the key. C is derived by mathematical 
analysis. It functions in much the same way as the weighted moving 
average. The older days receive less value in the calculations than the 
most recent, however, there is one difference. The relationship is 
exponential rather than being linear. C varies between one and zero . 
When C tends to one the more rapidly the formula's result will trail the 
price. Higher values are needed to give reliable guidelines in a highly 
volatile market. Smaller values for the smoothing constant supposedly 
give better indications in a stable market. 
The selection of the smoothing constant is determined by experimenting 
with the data. One must ascertain the value which dictates the best re-
sults. The following table designates some rough guidelines. 
Smoothing Constant 
.05 
.w 
.20 
.30 
.40 
Total weight of 
Most Recent N Days 
89.6% 
90.2 
89,2 
88 . 2 
87.0 
N 
44 
22 
10 
6 
4 
63 
The C value must be under constant scrutiny. As the market climate 
changes so does the smoothing constant. The initial starting point is 
derived by taking the average of the closing prices of the last ten days. 
Signals for entry are given by the intersection of the moving average 
price by the closing price. 
Working through an example, assume the ten day average price for corn 
is $3.00. The closing price for the same ten days turns out to be $3.05. 
The smoothing constant incorporated into this trial run is $.20. It 
possibly should be $.30 due to the volatility. The results must be tested 
to pinpoint the exact smoothing constant. 'llte new decision making price 
is arrived at by adding $3.00 + .2($3.05 - $3.00). The result sums to 
$3.01. If market price rises to meet indicated price by the close, a long 
position would be taken. When the price retreats to price given by the 
equation, the long position is stopped out and one takes a short position. 
'lllis strategy is not as clear cut as the previous ones. It requires 
experimentation to develop the proper smoothing constant . It is suggested 
that $.12 (31) is appropriate for the current corn market. The stop-loss 
may be modified to enhance the profitability of a different smoothing 
constant as being more appropriate. 
The object of these mechanical strategies is not to trace the market 
price exactly. If this were the case, there would never be entry. It is 
mandatory that the values provided by these strategies miss the actual 
price. This allows the trading plans to capture the benefits from a turn 
around in the market. 
The final proposed strategy is a development of the author. It 
resembles the other plans in a very basic way. It is a concoction of 
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trailing stop-sells and trailing stop-losses. It is designed for the 
decision maker, when hedging, to be open during price surges and protected 
against price declines. It can be adapted to speculation. The basic 
trading rules are as follows: (1) Set a trailing stop-sell a specified 
distance from the current price. As the price advances so does the 
potential selling price. A requirement is never to lower the stop-loss. 
(2) After the short position is entered, the stop-loss is positioned at a 
designated distance from the current market price. During the price drop 
the stop-loss follows the downward movement but it is never raised. 
Execution of the hedge occurs when the current price contacts the 
trailing stop-sell. Immediately the stop-loss takes effect . Both stops 
would be placed at a point greater than a limit move during a volatile 
market. Therefore i f the limit is shifted the stop is set in a position to 
compensate for the move. The reasoning behind the placement is the 
tendency for severe overnight investigation by traders after a limit move. 
Once the value of the grain hits this barrier one logically begins searching 
for the justification for the price behavior. If the move continues the 
stop will be moved in the appropriate direction and a hedging transaction 
would not be made. Likewise in a rather calm market with no major price 
moves the stops would be less than a limit move. Determining when a 
volatile market exists and the stops to use in a tranquil market will be 
established by testing the data. 
One can observe by surveying the data for the period 1962 to 1973 that 
the market moved from a remarkably stable situation to one of rapid fluctua-
tion in the later years of the period. The grain market has entered a new 
era from one of oversupply. The trading rules were shifted on several 
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occasions to ref lect this situation. Recognition of this fact is impera-
tive to the reasoning and justifications behind this strategy. In addition, 
experts on speculation say, "Let your profits run and cut your losses 
short." This theory should apply as well to hedging. 
As a further check on the results of this investigation, the results 
of each suggested strategy will be compared to the market analysis provided 
by Iowa Farm Outlook. Using the guidelines given in these articles the 
appropriate market decision will be executed. This comparison will pit 
technical analysis against fundamental analysis. Seldom if ever does one 
find an author of one of these publications who mentions anything of a 
technical nature. They are for the most part fundamentalists. 
To test this plan one would sell on the approximate date of the 
publication's arrival. Generally, readers examine the magazine or bulletin 
on the day it is received or the day after. If the marketing section 
advises the producer to hedge the order is transacted. Entries and exits 
to the market will be in accordance with the suggestions of these authors. 
For this study Iowa~ Outlook, a publication prepared by the extension 
economists at Iowa State University, will be used. It should provide a 
well-founded, unbiased base for a fundamentalist alternative. Other 
publications may, perhaps, propose more actions but this may be an attempt 
to sell more magazines. 
Modifications of these mechanical hedging strategies may be required. 
The annual net benefits of each plan will be tested for statistical sig-
nificance at the five percent level. Conmtlssions and interest costs for 
margin money will be deducted. The annual net income of each of the pro-
posed hedging strategies will be compared to the naive alternatives 
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currently in practice using their respective mean net prices and the 
standard deviations. Hopefully, the results will translate into potential 
earnings for producers and grain firms in Iowa. 
The storage income from each strat egy will be compar ed to what was 
paid to warehousemen by ASCS for holding corn in t heir facilities. These 
costs ( 1) are as follows: 
1/ 1/ 62 
7/1/ 63 
7/ 1/71 
7/1/73 
6/30/63 
6/30 / 71 
6/30/73 
12/31/73 
.037 of one cent /day/bushel 
.036 of one cent/day/bushel 
.040 of one cent /day/bushel 
.043 of one cent/day/bushel 
Another control in the storage income comparison will be the normal cash 
price rise (or fall) from December 1 to July 15. Storage income from the 
remaining strategies will be derived by the difference be tween the cash 
price on December 1 and the net return for the r espective marketing plan on 
July 15. Again the same statistical tests as before will be used to compare 
results. 
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RESULTS 
Naive Strategies 
The outcomes of the naive strategies will be examined first. These 
strategies are thought to be a realistic a pproximation of what producers 
do or can do. When comparing . the gross returns of these four alternatives 
in Table 1, it is found that during the entire period selling at harvest 
was never the most beneficial alternative. In seven of the eleven crop 
yea r s selling at harvest was the least desirable possibility. 
In six of the seasons the best results were generated from the blind 
hedges with a ten percent stop-loss. Only four times were the gross 
earnings from hedging at planting greater than selling at harvest. The 
harvest hedge produced larger gross earnings than harvest liquidation 
every crop year. Both blind hedges paid the same gross income during 
the 1967 -68 season. Otherwise, the storage hedge on December 1 earned 
equal or greater returns every season except for 1969-70 and 1971-72 . 
Random selling was the most profitable of the naive strategies five 
times during the period. Random selling did not exceed the next best 
strategy by a margin of more than ten cents per bushel . The analysis of 
variance test should indicate whether this was a mere chance happening or 
a meaningful difference . 
The rankings of the strategies when net returns are compared are 
essentially the same as the rankings from gross returns. Commission and 
interest expenses on the margin money rose as time elasped but never were 
these costs so substantial as to change the outcomes already discussed. 
These results are presented in Table 2a excluding inventory costs. 
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Discussion of hedging in textbooks generally takes for granted that 
once a hedge has been established liquidation does not take place until 
the commodity is sold in the cash market. Disallowing the ten percent 
stop-loss, the net return for the planting hedge in 1966-67 is $1.00 1/4 
and $1.08 5/8 in 1972-73. This reduces mean net price to $1.07 1/2. The 
harvest hedge rose to $1.09 3/8 in 1965-66 and in 1972-73 jumped to 
$1.20 7/8. Average net return for the harvest hedge dropped to $1.14 3/4. 
Benefits may accrue from having stop-losses on hedged positions. Table 2b 
summarizes and ranks all the naive strategies according to mean net price 
after interest cost for carrying inventory was subtracted . Interest cost 
on inventory is presented in Table lOb . None of the outcomes in the tables 
will have excluded the interest cost on inventory except Table lOc. 
'lhe harvest hedge with the stop-loss surpassed other alternatives as 
it had the highest mean net price. Some producers prefer this alternative 
over random selling because it has a slightly lower standard deviation. 
Tilere was a 2~¢ spread between the second-ranked random selling strategy 
and the harvest hedge strategy without stop-loss technique . The standard 
deviation of the third ranked strategy was lees than one-half the standard 
deviation for random selling. A wide gap existed between averages of the 
third and fourth marketing systems. The planting hedge utilizing stop-loss 
had a standard deviation of the third best marketing system. The two 
planting hedges fared about the same in mean net price and standard devia-
tions; however, operation with the stop-loss averaged slightly more . 
Selling a t harvest landed in sixth place by 1/8¢ on the average. Tile 
harvest selling strategy had a standard deviation double those of the 
planting hedges. 
Tl 
T2 
T3 
T4 
TS 
T6 
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Table 2b. The mean net price and standard deviation for each 
naive strategy (ranked from largest mean to the 
smalleft:mean) with interest expense for carrying 
inventory deducted 
Strategy 
Harvest hedge with 
the 10% stop-loss 
Random s el ling 
Harvest hedge 
without the stop-
loss 
Planting hedge 
with the 10% stop-
loss 
Planting hedge 
without the stop-
loss 
Harvest sale 
Mean net price 
$1.17 1/2 
$1.15 1/4 
$1.09 3/8 
$1.08 7/8 
$1.07 1/2 
$1.07 3/8 
Standard deviation 
$ .300 
.308 
.127 
.064 
.066 
.128 
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In order to detennine a definite ranking of the results it must 
first be ascertained if there is a significant difference between the 
various strategies or treatments. The F-test is generally appropriate 
for this test. The data generated an F-value of .521 as compared to a 
value of 2.37 necessary for significance found in a table (35) of F-values 
at the five percent level. One must conclude from thi.s test that there 
is no difference among the means. 
In suumary, one may reason that the harvest hedge with the stop-loss 
and random selling may be the better strategies for the period of years 
investigated even though the F-test could not detect a difference. This 
reasoning is based on the mean net price and standard deviation. 
Basis Strategy 
An analysis of the net returns showed a phenomenal range . The net 
benefits ranged from a $1,179.03 profit in 1966-67 to a devasting loss of 
$4,815.23 in 1972-73. This marketing plan earned positive returns when 
the basis behaved near its historical average. The mean net price was 
$1.13 3/4 with a s tandard deviation of $.097 . This system produced con-
sistent returns as demonstrated by the low standard deviation . These 
results are displayed in Table 3a. 
Examining the results more thoroughly it is discovered that six of the 
eleven seasons required less than $400.00 as a maximum invested in margin . 
The 1972-73 crop year required $1,575.00. 1964-65 had the minimum margin 
requirement of $231.25. Accordingly, the interest expense exceeded $10.00 
only five times. During the 1966-67 season, there was a $7 .28 income from 
margin withdrawn as paper profits. 1972-73 became the record season for 
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interest expense at $16.48. The same crop year ranked number one in number 
of transactions with 11. The basis followed an unusual pattern by 
narrowing a few cents from harvest then exploding at times throughout the 
remainder of the crop year. The volatility of the basis caused one 
following this strategy to enter and exit the market 11 times. Therefore, 
$330 . 00 was spent on conunissions. The remaining crop years had three 
transactions or less per season. Four required only one trade. 
The net benefits were losses seven out of 11 times. The four profit-
able years ranged from $50.66 in 1963-64 to the $1 , 179 . 03 already mentioned. 
The losses began at $51.99 in 1970-71 and dropped to the huge 1972-73 figure . 
Five of the losing crop years were less than $500 .00. In summary, this 
strategy showed stability and did not accrue tremendous expense for 
commissions except during the 1972-73 crop year. This is undoubtedly 
related to the fact that the basis follows a regular pattern . 
In examining the results of this marketing plan, one realizes that 
the hedges were placed when the basis was too narrow . Most of the pr ofits 
from basis change had ela~sed before market entry. In addition, it allowed 
several transactions during the same crop year when the basis was behaving 
normally. Of course one can do little to counteract a crop year like 
1972-73. When huge price surges persist cash prices lag behind futures 
causing a wider basis. Generally the basis will be greater at higher 
price levels than at lower ones. 
In order to improve the possible returns from marketing corn using 
the basis several modifications were made in the simulation model. The 
revised basis hedging strategy attempts to capture a wider basis by 
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78 
comparing the current daily basis to the average weekly basis for the 
respective week. If the daily basis is equal to or greater than the 
average by a standard deviation plus one-half cent a hedge is initiated. 
It is thought the basis may be near its summit at this point. 
A limit is placed on both sides of the hedge. A stop-loss is posi-
tioned one-half of an average weekly standard deviation above the daily 
basis at the time of market entry. It is placed sufficiently near the 
market entry to curb gigantic losses. Th.e one-half average weekly 
standard deviation puts the stop at the end point of the normal distribu-
tion. If the stop-loss is executed the reentry point becomes one average 
weekly standard deviation. If this portion of the modified basis strategy 
becomes effective the basis will be abnormally wide. 
Th.e other limit will hopefully close out the hedge when it is narrow. 
Liquidation will occur when the daily basis is less than the average 
weekly basis by more than one standard deviation plus one-half cent. At 
this point the strategy will revert back to checking for a wide basis 
unless the owner chooses to liquidate his cash position. 
Tilis marketing system can easily be adapted to a series of equations. 
Th.ey are as follows: 
1. CDB,.. AWB + (AWSD + $.005) 
2. HSL = CDBl + 1/2 AWSD 
3. HRE = PDB + 1 2 AWSD 
4. CDB = AWB - (AWSD - $ .005) 
Hedge initiation 
Stop-loss on existing hedge 
Reentry of liquidated hedge 
Hedge liquidation or the last 
session on or near July 15 
1 Current daily b.asis. at th.e beginning of the hedge. 
2rt is also tested with a one-half AWSD. 
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Where CDB is the current daily basis, AWB refers to the average 
weekly &asis and AWSD is the average weekly standard deviation . HSL is the 
stop-loss for the current hedge while RRE is the reentry hedge if the stop-
loss was effective. PDB means peak daily basis. Once hedge liquidation 
occurs, the strategy reverts back to equation 1. 
'nle modified basis strategy, using the one-half average weekly 
standard deviation stop-loss, gave a profitable return every crop year 
except 1972-73 . Tite loss that year amounted to nearly $1.00 per bushel . 
This was the only crop year where the stop- loss terminated a trade. In 
other words, there was either one trade or none at all for the rest of the 
seasons. During the 1962-66 and 1968-70 crop years, there were no trades. 
The basis was so narrow that the producer could gain little from hedging. 
Re may lose five to six cents by the uae of the strategy but the plan 
attempts to guard against major price declines. 
Evaluating the net returns, the profits ranged from $136.09 to $702.98 
over the four crop years with one market entry . This strategy required 
little commission expense except for 1972-73. Th.e abnormal basis behavior 
resulted in eight transactions with an overwhelming loss of $4,991 .05. 
The interest expense was at $38.55 . The maximum investment in margin rose 
to $4,662.50 . nte results for 1972-73 were not improved by moving from 
one-half to one standard deviation. The net loss fell to $5,592.33. This 
variation will be excluded due to its failure to enhance the returns. 
The greater loss may be partially explained by a delay in market entrance 
and exit when the price moved substantially. 
Reviewing the other four crop years where the strategy was in effect, 
interest expense ranged from $1.17 in 1970-71 to $8.91 in 1971-72. The 
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maximum investment in margin peaked at $625.00 in 1966-67. The other 
three were $500.00 and below. The mean net price for this marketing 
system was $1.16 1/8 with a standard deviation of $.093 . This is a 
definite improvement over the first basis strategy. 
Comparing the two basis strategies, one detects a poorly positioned 
liquidation point in the first basis strategy. The basis may narrOW' 
suddenly and then enlarge. Under the first basis strategy chances are 
that a hedge would have been closed and reopened. Its counterpart probably 
would have maintained a hedge throughout this short deviation from average. 
In essence, the modified basis captured a wider basis and allowed price to 
swing considerably before the hedge was stopped out. Using weekly averages 
alleviated the possibility of early liquidation. Once the hedge was made 
in the modified plan it continued until the latter part of hedging period. 
Three point reversal method 
Analyzing the three point reversal method one finds a strategy 
capable of signaling, under certain conditions, many market entries. 
Perhaps the six cent range, three boxes at two cents each, should be 
altered when highly volatile markets persist. During the 1972-73 crop 
year there were sixteen transactions. The greatest number of transactions 
for the other crop years was three. Th.ere was no trading in 1962-63. 
Five crop years had one trade. For the most part there was little trading 
with the exception of the final crop year. The mean net price for the 
time period hit $1.19 1/4 with a $. 227 standard deviation. 
The three point reversal method produced three profitable crop years 
and seven losing crop years. The net positive benefits reached $605.42 for 
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1967-68. All three profitable years had substantial gains. This 
strategy suffered a loss of $1,333.53 in 1972-73. Three years the losses 
were under $100.00. The maximum investment in margin was $1,450.00 in 
1972-73. Five of the periods required less than $300.00 in margin. The 
margin for the other five crop years ranged from $468.75 to $631 .25 . The 
interest expenses were extremely low with this market strategy registering 
a low of nine cents in 1963-64. In 1972-73 interest expense was $9.78. 
This strategy would have resulted in an income of $2.42 in 1967-68. Six 
of the 11 time segments had interest expenses below $5 .00. 
This strategy was slow to react in a sluggish market . This was 
because the two cent value per box placed an undue restriction on the 
strategy. The major portion of the price move was past before the signal 
was given to sell. In 1972-73 the opposite was true and the strategy 
produced too many trades during the minor price bulges and troughs in the 
generally rising market. 
To pinpoint the idiosyncrasies of this system more accurately, the 
individual crop years are explored in more detail. Three times a trade 
was terminated due to the July 15 deadline. This strategy was beneficial 
when gradual price rises and declines persisted . A producer would have 
fared well by following this strategy in 1970-71. A hedge was in effect 
until late May due to a market turnaround . Price rose until late June 
when another hedge was placed. It did not enter and exit at the very top 
or bottom due to six cents allowance built into the strategy. Sometimes 
six cents was excessive and other times insufficient. When there was 
a sudden price change in the middle of a move, it caused an unnecessary 
trade. A slight price variation caused the hedge to be closed out with 
86 
another hedge coming two sessions later. Price declines which took place 
over a period of four weeks created a loss of $247.94 in 1969-70 even 
though a bull market was in progress. 
The last crop year investigated was a disaster for this hedging 
strategy. Daily ranges were sweeping with fluctuations being rapid . 'Ihe 
longest duration of any hedge was nineteen days; seven of sixteen trades 
lasted two days or less. These were extremel y quick price changes . 'Ihese 
short term hedges produced the majority of the loss. 'Ihe profits generally 
came from the trades which. were in existence a longer period of time. 
All trades were executed at the close. This may have lowered profits. 
However, when analyzing this strategy, it is difficult to connnence a trade 
at any other time. The decision maker does not know until the end of the 
session whether a new box is reached either on the top or bottom side. 
Simple moving average 
Several modifications were made in order to generate better results 
from the simple moving average. Problems were encountered in programming 
due to entry and exit even though the market was either declining or 
climbing. The strategy would hedge due to a wide, chance fluctuation in 
the market. Tlie entry price was intersected, so it sold. '!his was solved 
by programming market entry only when the average declined. It may not 
hedge on that day but it would scan the range. nie strategy would hedge 
if the price was reached. Once in the market, exit did not take place 
until the average rose. 
Inverting the entry and exit points was attempted and exhibited worse 
results than the designated procedure. One problem with a simple moving 
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average was that it indicated a hedge after the market had already moved 
down substantially. In essence, it was sometimes too late to hedge. It 
takes several sessions for the effects of lower prices to be translated 
into the average. Th.ere is no weighting. Bear markets plummet while bull 
markets climb gradually. The same phenomenon took place at the trough of 
the price movement. Exit would take place after price had risen a bit. 
Therefore, added gains are erased by this characteristic of the simple 
moving average. 
Th.e simple moving average generated losses every crop year except 
1967-68 and 1968-69. These profits were $.08 1/4 respectively. Negative 
returns for the other nine seasons ranged from $.01 1/4 to $.37 1/2. Th.e 
large loss occurred during the 1972-73 season . Six of these losing 
seasons generated losses less than three cents. Th.e average net return 
was $1.17 3/4 w:tth a standard deviation of $.194. 
Th.is strategy required fifty-three trades. The 1963-64 and 1966-67 
crop years used seven entries and exits. Th.ese were the peak years. Th.e 
1968-69 period was the lowest with three transactions. Over the entire 
period $1,310.00 were spent on commissions. llte interest expense never 
amounted to more than $11.00 in any one crop year of the investigation. 
Th.e least interest expense incurred was $3.96. Th.e 1972-73 crop required 
a maximum investment in margin of $1,975.00 which was the highest for 
the entire 11 year period for this strategy. The lowest maximum invest-
ment was in 1969-70 totaling $262.50. Seven of the 11 crop years required 
margin investments of less than $500 .00. 
Analyzing the simple moving average further one discovers that for 
the most part this strategy is a function of average daily range. When 
90 
the range is narrow small price changes can initiate a hedge. The average 
range moved between 3/8¢ and 1 3/8¢ during 1962-63. This caused too many 
trades to take place. In a sluggish market, like the ones at the beginning 
of the investigated period, hedges were executed when there was a rela-
tively small price change. This strategy works best when the market 
maintains one direction or, if it turns, when the price reverses gradually. 
There is one further qualification. No sudden price surges can take place 
or hedges are placed when the market is still rising or falling. Of course 
in a sluggish market, entry and exit came too late. The price move was 
oftentimes complete before the hedge was executed. Many of the trades 
were of short duration. The two longest enduring transactions were 74 
and 77 days during the 1965-66 and 1968-69 crop years respectively. 
Major price trend directional indicator 
The Major Price Trend Directional Indicator (MPTDI) is basically a 
modification of the simple moving average. Average net return was improved 
nearly five cents over the less complex model. The marketing plan remained 
at the twenty-five day calculation until the 1970-71 crop year. However, 
it did not shift to the type B (refer to the procedure) weighting until the 
last two months. The procedure used in 1971-72 reverted back to the pre-
1971 method of computation. The model switched between the 15- and 20-day 
weighted average often during the 1972-73 crop year. 
111.ere were transactions executed every crop year. First place was 
won &y 1968-69 with five trades. The other crop years had either three 
or four trades. Commissions did not devastate any one of the gains from 
futures market operations for any one crop year. Comparing outcomes by 
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crop year s the losers outnumbered winners by one during the investigated 
period. The 1972-73 crop year had the greatest loss with $786 . 17. Two 
seasons marked-up losses of less than $20 .00. Profits peaked at $474.22 
in 1966-67. In 1964-65 the gain amounted to only $10.84. 
The capital needs mounted to $1,475.00 in 1972-73. Eight of the 
11 crop years required less than $360. 00. The interest expense never 
exceeded $10.05 during the entire investigation. In 1967-68 an interest 
income of $.93 was earned. Four years registered i nterest expenses of 
less than $5.00. The weighted average (MPTDI) strategy made the proper 
change to reflect the market activity. The indicated entry point of the 
MPTDI did not lag the price movement as much as the simple moving average. 
However, the trades were still not initiated and liquidated with proper 
timing as too many losses were incurred. 
Noting the differences between this strategy and the simple moving 
average one can count 11 fewer transactions for the MPTDI. This fact 
exists due to the three basic variables that exist in this marketing plan. 
The changing stop-loss , the weighting and the number of days involved in 
calculating the average are the three improvements . Many of the problems 
that persisted in the simple moving average are the same. There are still 
too many trades, especially those that lasted four days or less. The 
price only spanned a range of $ . 06 5/8 during 1964-65 yet there were four 
trades. The 1966-67 crop year was one of gener ally declining prices with 
four hedges. Overall, the plan generated a profit but an unnecessary in-
and-out in early June lowered benefits by $128.88. The MPTDI maintained 
its hedges longer than the simple movi ng average . One hedge endured for 
94 
118 days in 1970-71. The lag problem created a majority of the loss in 
1972-73. The MPTDI did not follow the market advantageously for the 
hedger. 
Exponential S·moothing 
The exponential smoothing strategy was tested with one-tenth changes 
in the smoothing constant. The net returns from the nine different 
smoothing constants are presented in Table 7a. The 1962-63 crop year 
is the only one which exhibited a trend. The smaller-valued constants 
generated the greater returns. The other crop years demonstrated a 
similar pattern but there were aberrations. These were created by the 
different market entry and exit times indicated by this marketing plan. 
A one- or two-session delay can mean a several hundred dollar loss. 
Price moves oftentimes are rapid. Trading at the close may have decreased 
the returns. However, the profits and losses should offset each other. 
The mean net prices resulting from all nine smoothing constants were 
tested to determine whether they were significantly different from each 
other. The F-test was employed and the F-value was calculated to be 3.10. 
Comparing this figure to the value given in the tables (35), 2.06 at the 
five percent level, one concludes that there is a difference between the 
means. The calculated F was greater than the F given by the F-table. The 
next step was a test of linearity. It was hypothesized that there was a 
linear relationship between the smoothing constant and its outcomes. As 
smoothing constant shrank the returns rose. The analysis of variance 
for this hypothesis can be found in Table 7c. These results show that a 
major portion of the relationship can be explained by a linear equation. 
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Table 7b. Net mean prices for different levels of smoothing 
constants 
Value of 
smoothing constant Average Standard deviation 
.1 1.18 5/8 .204 
.2 1.17 1/2 .211 
.3 1.13 1/4 .104 
.4 1.10 3/8 .091 
.5 1.09 1/2 .103 
.6 1.07 1/2 .108 
.7 1.06 3/4 .097 
.8 1.06 1/2 .085 
.9 1.09 3/8 .147 
Table 7c. Analysis of variance 
Degrees of Sum Mean 
freedom of squares squares 
Years 10 1.134 .113 
Smoothing constants 8 .169 .163 
Linear effect (1) .131 .131 
Quadratic effect (1) .031 .031 
Lack of fi:t (6) .007 .001 
Residual 80 .543 .00678 
98 
Table 7d. Correlation coefficients for each individual 
crop year 
Crop year R2 
1962-63 .944 
1963-64 .905 
1964-65 .922 
1965-66 .891 
1966-6 7 .238 
1967-68 .580 
1968-69 • 714 
1969-70 .814 
1970-71 .782 
1971-72 .961 
1972-73 .869 
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However, there was a significant quadratic effect. This effect may be 
explained by the higher mean net price for the 1972-73 crop year in Table 
7b. One can conclude that the lower-valued smoothing constants generated 
significantly better outcomes when the entire 1962-73 period is con-
sidered. When reviewing Table 7b, one observes that the returns with the 
smoothing constant placed at the one-tenth level is clearly a oet ter 
strategy. It has a higher mean net price and a lower standard deviation 
than the results at the level where C = .2 . 
Another hypothesis was tested for each individual year. It was 
hypothesized that for each individual year a different smoothing constant 
would be appropriate. More volatile markets would conceivably have 
larger smoothing constants. R2 , the coefficient of determination , was 
used as the measure. These values can be found in Table 7d. The outcomes 
for 1966-67 and 1967-68 demonstrated a low correlation. Ln general, one 
can again conclude that the relationship can be explained oy a straight 
line. However, the results also point out that there are some quadratic 
effects exemplified by the lower R2 1s. Perhaps the mean net prices for 
the crop years shield some things that might not have been detected . 
In order to improve the outcomes of the exponential smoothing 
strategy, the outcome with the smoothing constant at the .05 level was 
computed. These outcomes are presented in Table 7e . The mean net price 
is $1.22 with a standard deviation of .255 . The net average price at 
th.e .05 level was above the outcome with the constant at the .1 level . 
A smaller smoothing constant, .03, was tried for further improvement . 
Again, referring to Table 7e one discovers the trend continuing. A 
100 
smoothing constant with a value of .01 was selected next in an effort to 
add further improvement. The net average price leveled off. 
In choosing the appropriate representative of the smoothing constant 
strategy, an F-test was conducted to ascertain whether or not there was a 
significant difference among coefficients. Therefore, the .03 smoothing 
constant was selected for it had a slightly higher mean net price. The 
detailed results of this strategy are presented in Table 7f. 
There was an interesting turnaround in 1972-73 as no more transac-
tions occurred during this period than for any of the other crop years. 
'nlere were only two transactions. The 1963-64 crop year was first with 
seven trades. The smaller smoothing constant distributed the weight of 
each day's prices over a greater number of days. The 1971-72 crop year 
registered five mark.et entries. In six of the eleven cases there were 
two or fewer transactions. 
The greatest loss was generated in 1972-73 and this amounted to 
$539.08. Losing years outnumbered winning years by three. Five times 
losses were less than $225.00. In 1966-67 and 1967-68 profits were pro-
duced in excess of $600.0n, $604.09 and $609.10 respectively. The 
interest expense never surpassed $6.27. In 1962-63 it amounted to only 
$.86. The crop year lq67-68 gave a $3.10 interest income. In other 
words, capital demands of this strategy were negligible. The maximum 
investment in margin is somewhat correlated to the interest expense 
(income). Tb.e peak year for margin requirements was 1972 with $650.00, 
and 1970-71 ran a close second with. $562.50. The remaining crop years 
were all under $356.25 except 1966-67 which required $450.00. The least 
margin ($250.00) was needed during 1964-65. 
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Table 7e . Net outcomes for different levels of smoot hing constant 
(rounded) 
Crop 
Smoothing constant value 
year .05 .03 • 01 
1962 - 63 $1.11 3/4 $1.11 $1. 14 1/2 
1963-64 1.00 1/ 4 .97 3/ 4 1.04 1/2 
1964-65 1.10 3/4 1. 10 7/ 8 1.11 1/2 
1965- 66 1.20 1.19 3/8 1.13 5/8 
1966-6 7 1.22 5/8 1.28 1/8 1.25 7/8 
1967-68 1.09 5/8 1.13 1/8 1.14 1/8 
1968- 69 1.10 1/4 1.12 1/8 1.07 1/8 
1969- 70 1.19 1/8 1.18 3/4 1.18 7/8 
1970-71 1.36 1/2 1.32 1/2 1.27 1/4 
1971-72 1.07 5/ 8 1.04 1/8 1.05 1/8 
1972-73 1.93 1/8 2. 00 1/ 4 1.94 1/8 
Average 1.22 1.22 1/ 2 1. 22 3/8 
Standard 
deviation .255 . 276 . 256 
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Trailing stop 
The trailing stop strategy, after some modifications, generated some 
highly profitable results. The strategy was tested initially using the 
clos es . The trailing stops were determined from the close of the market 
on the previous day. Trade execution took place on the close if the 
market touched to stop. !be modifications which enhanced the results 
were to change the calculations of the stops. Tile stop-sell was derived 
by making subtractions from the previous day's high. Tile stop-loss is 
figured from the low and all transactions take place at the indicated 
stops. 
An examination of the trailing stop strategy using the closes dis-
closes that in 6 of the 11 crop years there were no transactions . There 
was only one trade in three of th.e remaining five seasons. Tile 1972-73 
crop year had six mark.et entries and exits. Th.ree of the five seasons 
produced profits with two crop years of losses. During 1972-73 the loss 
exceeded 35 cents. Profits did not exceed 15 cents for the season. 
The maximum investment required was $1,125.00 fo r margin and this 
was for 1972-73 . The least amount of margin needed totaled $275 . 00 . Tile 
commission summed to $180.00 during the last crop year . Interest expense 
ranged from $2 .42 to $11.44 per crop year. 
Moving to the trailing stop strategy employing the highs and lows a 
somewhat improved situation is found. The average return for the entire 
period was $1.27 3/8 with a standard deviation of $.439 . The mean of the 
previous strategy was $1 . 20 3/4 with a standard deviation of $ .192. The 
modified plan did not require a trade in 5 of the 11 crop years . Four of 
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the six remaining seasons had one trade. The system generated eight 
trades in 1972-73. 1here was only one loss produced which was $.08 3/8 
during the 1965-66 season. The remainder created net returns ranging 
from 5/7¢ to 46 1/2¢. The largest gain came in the 1972-73 season. 
This strategy required a maximum investment of $1,000.00 for margin. 
The least amount needed was $275.00. The maximum investment in margin 
was less than $650.00 five of the six crop years. The interest expense 
was minimal, never rising above $5 .59 for any one year. Commissions 
ranged from $22.00 to $240.00 with the latter figure occurring during 
the 1972-73 season. 
Comparing the original plan to the modification, one discovers that 
by using the first strategy there were fewer market entries. There were 
no transactions in the 1965-66 crop year and two fewer in 1972-73. The 
first plan required a greater requirement of margin. More money was spent 
on commissions under the modified strategy. However, interest expense was 
nearly $10.00 less than the plan employing the closes. There were more 
profitable years with gains being larger using the modification. Th.e loss 
was not as large as the dramatic loss of the 1972-73 season incurred in 
the original plan. The modification was a highly beneficial improvement. 
Further changes were incorporated into the modified trailing stop 
strategy. In nearly half of the crop years in the previous two trailing 
stop strategies there was no market entry. Prices during these time 
periods covered a very narrow range. Th.e trailing stops were reduced 
from eight and one-fourth cents to three cents and five cents to investi-
gate their potential. These two new" trailing stops were tested throughout 
the designated time period. 
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The outcome of the five cents trailing stop still resulted in no 
market entry during 1962-63. The rest of the crop years had at least 
one trade . The crop year 1966-67 had three transactions and 1968-71 
indicated two each. Profitable outnumbered losing years by two. The 
beneficial years ranged from $.01 1/8 to $.67 1/2 in net returns. The 
losses fell from $.01 7/8 to $.08 1/2. Maximum investment reached 
$1,000.00 and was a low $250.00 for two crop years. Commissions topped 
at $510.00 in 1972-73. Interest varied from income of $.63 up to expenses 
of $11.36. Three crop years needed less than $.40 for interest cost. 
Surveying the three cent trailing stop one observes that a transac-
tion took place every crop year. Only one trade was executed three of 
the eleven crop years. During 1966-67 and 1970-71, there were six market 
entries. Losing seasons numhered five while the profitable ones hit 
seven. One crop year provided almost no return from the futures operation. 
Profits were spread from $.11 1/2 to $.27 1/4. Losses ran from $.00 3/8 
to $.OS. Peak investment in margin for the entire period was $1,000.00. 
The least required was $300.00. Commissions ranged from $22.00 to $750.00. 
Interest was always an expense. The maximum was $12.69. Four of the 
eleven crops fell below $3.50 for interest cost. 
There are more transactions with the three cent stop than with the 
five cent trailing stop. Losses are greater and profits are smaller with 
the five cent model. 1h.e three cent trailing stop improved returns eight 
of the eleven seasons. 
In order to determine the full limit of this strategy , higher levels 
of trailing stops were tested at five cent intervals up to fifty cents. 
The results of the four alternatives already discussed are included. The 
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Table Sf. Mean net prices and standard deviations from 
trailing stop (rounded) 
Trailing stop Mean net price Standard deviation 
.03 1.13 1/8 
.05 1.26 7/8 
.08 1/4 - 10 1/48 1.20 3/4 
.08 1/4 - 10 1/4 1.27 3/8 
.15 1.22 1/4 
. 20 1.23 7/8 
.25 1.25 3/4 
.30 - .so 1.25 3/4 
8using the closes to calculate the stops. 
Table 8g. Mean net prices for the trailing stop 
strategy ranked 
Value of trailing stop Mean net price 
.03 1.32 1/8 
• 08 l/ 4 - 10 1/ 4 1.27 3/8 
.05 1.26 7/8 
.25 1.25 3/4 
.30 - • 50 1. 25 3/4 
.20 1.23 7/8 
.08 1/4 - 10 l/4a 1. 20 3/4 
8using the closes to calculate the stops. 
.500 
. 390 
.192 
.439 
.400 
.390 
.404 
.404 
llB 
net outcome of each is displayed in Table Be. The mean net price and 
standard deviation of all the trailing stop strategies are shown in Table 
Bf. 
Reviewing the net outcomes of each trailing stop, one finds that 
after 30 cents is reached there is no change. The trailing stop was only 
effective for 1972-73. The other crop years had no trades. One can 
detect other crop years where the trailing stop was ineffective. This 
strategy worked remark.ably well at all levels for the 1972-73 crop year . 
There was one exception however. When the closes were used as the 
foundation for calculation there was a loss. This was the only marketing 
plan that accrued profits for the last crop year of the study. 
Visually surveying the mean net prices, one observes that all forms 
of this strategy have a large standard deviation as compared to the other 
marketing plans. The net average price is substantially higher . As the 
trailing stop increases in value the average price declines and levels 
off. There are fewer market entries when the trailing stop approaches 50 
cents. This would require the decision maker to carry a greater share of 
the price risk. The strategy catches major price swings with a larger 
stop-loss but they must be gigantic moves. 'llle .OB 1/4 - $. 10 1/4 trailing 
stop provides more price protection than those with larger values. 
Table Bg ranks the mean net prices from largest to smallest. To 
solidify this ranking the same procedure is employed as used for the order-
ing of the naive strategies. One must first run an F-test to determine 
whether or not there is a significant difference among the means. The 
test demonstrated there were no significant differences among the means. 
In other words, they are all considered to be equal. For purposes of 
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comparison the two strategies with the highest mean net prices will be 
selected. These are the three cent and the 8 1/4 - 10 1/4 cent trailing 
Iowa Farm Outlook 
Checking the outcomes of the advice of professional agricultural 
economists has to be done in an arbitrary fashion. When "late spring -
early SUITlller" selling recommendations are made, one has to arbitrarily 
decide on the exact selling date. The midpoint of the advised time period 
was chosen to market the corn. If Outlook Publications (7,8,27) indicated 
that when a certain price level was attained one should sell then a sale 
was made if this price was reached. Perhaps the next issue would reconmend 
selling within a different price range. However, if the first advised 
price was reached prior to the revision, the corn was sold . The outcomes 
of hedging recommendations are presented in Table 9. The results were 
based on a 10 percent stop-loss. The footnotes indicate the realized net 
price if one remained with his hedge until the suggested cash selling date. 
Remaining with a hedge throughout all types of market situations is a 
philosophy that many prescribe, 
The 10 percent stop-loss generated a mean net price of $1 . 23 3/4 with 
a standard deviation of $.217. Ignoring the 10 percent rule the mean net 
price was $1.17 with a standard deviation of $.120 . This suggests that 
constantly monitoring a hedged position will improve returns. The Outlook 
results will be analyzed further in comparison to the outcomes of the 
other strategies. 
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Table 9 . Marketing recommendations from Iowa Farm Outlook (7,8,27) 
Crop Cash sale Cash Hedging Return from 
year date price date(s) Option hedge(s) Net return 
1962-63 3/15/63 $1.07 $1.07 
1963-64 5/15/64 $1.10 1/2 $1.10 1/2 
1964-65 4/15/65 $1 . 18 $1.18 
1965-66 5/2/66 $1.14 1/2 $1.14 1/2 
1966-67 1/9/67 $1.26 $1 . 26 
1967- 68 5/15/68 $1.07 1/2 $1.07 1/2 
1968-69 5/29/69 $1.15 $1.15 
1969-70 6/25/70 $1.20 $1.20 
1970-71 8/25/71 $1.34 1/2 6/l/70a March (12 5/8¢) $1. 27 l/4b 
8/17/70 July (8¢) 
1971-72 2/15/72 $1.04 1/2 3/18/71 March (27 1/2¢) $1.31 
1972-73 6/25/73 $2.00 4/3/72 March (1¢) $1. 84 3/ 4c 
8/15/72a July (13 3/4¢) 
8 Ten percent stop-loss employed. 
bRemaining with the advised hedge in March corn the net price was 
$1.40 1/8 by liquidating the futures on the date of the cash sale. 
cRemaining with the advised hedge in July corn the net price was 
$.97 3/4 by liquidating the futures on the date of cash sale . 
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Mean Net Price 
Each strategy must be put in proper perspective with the others . One 
way to do this is to simply review the mean net prices and standard de-
viations. The ideal strategy is one with a high mean net price and a low 
standard deviation. The drastic jump in prices during 1972-73 causes this 
method to have less value than one would ordinarily expect . The last 
crop year studied demolished the idea of positive returns from most of the 
strategies. The trailing stop marketing plans were the only ones to 
generate a return in the black. The mean net prices to this point have not 
considered the interest cost incurred in holding an inventory where it 
applies. All strategies have not been adjusted for interest charges in 
Table lOa. Table lOb designates the interest cost incurred from storing 
grain for the various strategies . Table lOc displays the adjusted mean 
net prices ranked and the corresponding standard deviations of each 
marketing plan . There was a substantial reduction due to interest charges 
for some of the strategies. 
There is not one strategy which fits the perfect model that was 
mentioned previously. In general, as the mean net price rose so did the 
standard deviation. The trailing stop marketing systems were the only ones 
which surpassed the marketing actions suggested by Outlook with a stop-loss . 
A number of the alternatives exceeded the Outlook returns without a stop-
loss. 
The trailing stop strategies generated the greatest return for the 
period investigated. The trailing stop and the modified basis plans each 
had the same number of crop years showing a return over selling on July 15. 
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Pointing out some other items in Table lOa, random selling may no t be an 
attractive possibility for some producers because of a high standard devi-
ation. Harvest selling falls into the same category with random selling 
when compared to the planting hedges. The decision maker would generally 
be advised to choose a strategy with a smaller range of possible outcomes. 
Examining the wide dispersion of the returns, it is difficult to select 
one best strategy. The first step in the statistical analysis of the 
means is to ascertain if there is a difference among the means which is 
greater than a chance happening. An analysis of variance test indicates 
that the differences among the means could occur as a matter of chance 
five percent or more of the time . However, as indicated earlier, the 
F- test applies to random data or analysis of samples drawn from normally 
distributed populations and may not always detect differences in economic 
data. Perhaps no statistical test is needed nor appropriate for data of 
this nature. It is a point which frequently plagues economists. Profits 
and losses in grain production are measured in dollars and cents and the 
best plan is the one which gives the highest value. Success is often 
determined by a few units per bushel. Statistical analysis is not 
performed on the records of those who went broke and those who were 
succesaful to determine if there was a significant difference in the 
outcomes. A system whi.ch. gives a high.er average price consistently has 
merit even though. the difference may be small. 
The planting hedges and harvest selling should be lower in the 
decision maker's scale of priorities of buying and selling corn. 11:te 
strategies using the basis fall on one of the lower rungs of the ladder 
towards the most profit. 
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Table lOa. Mean net prices for all strategies with inventory 
interest expense excluded 
Strategy Mean net price 
1. Harvest selling 
2 . Hedge at planting with stop-loss 
3 . Hedge at planting without 
stop-loss 
4 . Harvest hedge with stop- loss 
5. Harvest hedge without the 
stop-loss 
6. Random selling 
7. Basis change 
8. Modified basis change 
9 . Three point reversal 
10. Simple moving average 
11 . Major price trend directional 
indicator 
12. Exponential smoothing 
13 . Trailing stop 
14. Trailing stop with highs and lows 
15 . Outlook with the stop-loss 
16 . Outlook without the stop-loss 
$1.07 3/8 
1.08 7/ 8 
1.07 1/ 2 
1.22 7/ 8 
1.14 3/4 
1.19 3/ 8 
1.13 3/4 
1.16 1/8 
1.19 1/4 
1.17 3/ 4 
1.22 3/ 8 
1.22 1/2 
1. 32 1/ 8 
1.27 3/8 
1.23 3/4 
1.17 
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Table lOb. I nterest expense per bushel for carrying inventory 
Cost from Cost fo r those Cost for those who 
Crop year 12/1 to 7/lS who sell randomly sell by using Outlook 
1962-63 $ .04 3/4 $.04 1/8 $.02 7/8 
1963- 64 .OS .03 3/8 .04 1/4 
1964-6S .OS 3/8 .02 1/2 . 04 
1965-66 . OS 1/4 . 04 3/8 . 04 1/8 
1966- 67 .06 1/8 .08 5/8 .oo 7/8 
1967-68 .04 3/4 .04 3/8 .04 1/8 
1968- 69 . 05 1/8 .06 3/8 . 04 1/2 
1969 -70 .OS 1/8 . 02 . 04 3/4 
1970-71 .06 3/8 . 03 3/8 .08 1/2 
1971 - 72 .04 7/8 .02 1/4 
1972 - 73 .06 3/8 .09 3/4 .os 7/8 
Average . 05 3/8 . 04 3/8 .04 1/4 
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Table lOc. Ranking of strategies after deducting interest costs 
on inventories 
Ranking Strategy Mean net price 
Standard 
deviation 
1 Three cent trailing stop $1.26 3/4 
2 Trailing stop with the highs 
and lows 1.22 
3 Outlook with the stop-loss 1.19 1/2 
4 Harvest hedge with the stop-
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
loss 
Exponential smoothing (C = .03) 
MPTDI 
Random selling 
Three point reversal 
Outlook without the stop-loss 
Simple moving average 
Modified basis change 
Harvest hedge without the 
stop-loss 
Hedge at planting with the 
stop-loss 
Basis change 
Hedge at planting without 
the stop-loss 
Harvest selling 
1.17 1/2 
1.17 1/8 
1.17 
1.15 1/4 
1.13 7 /8 
1.12 3/4 
1.12 3/8 
1.10 3/4 
1.09 3/8 
1.08 7 /8 
1.08 3/8 
1. 07 1/2 
1.07 3/8 
$.500 
.439 
.217 
.300 
.276 
. 256 
. 308 
.227 
.217 
.194 
. 093 
.127 
.064 
.097 
.066 
.128 
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The 1972-73 crop year lowered the profit potential of all of the 
strategies except for the trailing stops, planting hedges and harvest 
selling. The trailing stop marketing methods demonstrated a remarkable 
ability to cope with the volatility of the market. The 1972-73 crop year 
was the beginning of another era. An analysis of the outcomes of the 
crop years prior to 1972-73 may offer further insight into the better ways 
to sell corn . A t-test was conducted on those strategies with stop-losses 
to determine significance. The results indicated there was none . 
The F-value, for differences among the means, derived for this time 
period was not significant at the five percent level, however, the standard 
deviations were reduced by more than one half. This confirms the pre-
viously stated conclusion for the 1972-73 crop year. The means are 
presented in ranked fonn Table lOd. The trailing stop systems did not 
fare as well as previously. The professional economist's reconmendat ions 
moved into the top two places. This may indicate the quandry in which 
economists found themselves during 1972-73. The harvest hedges fell into 
the bottom two slots. The weighted moving average (MPTDI) jumped to third 
place. 
To summarize the outcomes of this section, when relative tranquility 
persists in the market there is a much different ordering of the marketing 
alternatives. The harvest hedges sank in profitability and were eliminated 
as a possibility. It appears that there is merit to following professional 
advice. The selected strategies, for the most part, outperformed those 
conducted !n practice. 
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Table lOd. Ranked mean net prices for all strategies excluding 
the 1972-73 crop year (rounded) 
Ranking 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Strategy Mean net price 
Outlook without the stop-loss 1. 14 7/8 
Outlook with the stop-loss 1.13 5/8 
MPI'DI 1. 12 3 / 4 
Three cent trailing stop 1. 12 1/4 
Modified basis change 1.11 1/8 
Exponential smoothing (C = .03) 1.09 1/2 
Trailing stop with the high and 
lows using 8\ - 10\ cents 1.09 1/8 
Basis change 1. 08 1/2 
Planting hedge with the stop-
loss 1.08 3/8 
Three point reversal 1.07 1/2 
Planting hedge without the stop-
loss 1. 07 3/8 
Simple moving average 1. 06 7/8 
Random selling 1. 06 5/8 
Harvest selling 1.05 3/8 
Harvest hedge without the stop-
los s 
Harvest hedge with the stop-loss 
1. 03 1/8 
1. 03 1/8 
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Net storage i n come comparison 
Examining the storage income possibilities from December 1 to July 15 
provides some results which, perhaps, are more meaningful to the ware-
houseman th.an the producer. Two controls are established for this compari-
son. One of the standards is the storage payments made by Agricultural 
Stabilization and Conservation Service. This is the bare minimum one could 
receive for storing corn without taking much. risk. The other standard is 
the normal cash price change throughout the period. If one were to simply 
buy corn at harvest and sell at mid-summer, the returns are what he would 
receive from his endeavors. These costs would be equivalent each year and 
would not distort the relation of any one of the strategies to the others. 
The net outcomes are best thought of as returns to storage. The net price 
on July 15 minus the December 1 cash price determines the net storage 
income for the various hedging strategies. Of course, the planting 
hedges were eliminated as well as random selling and the harvest sale. 
The outcomes for each individual crop year are presented in Table 11. 
Reviewing these returns to storage, the three cent trailing stop was 
the most beneficial alternative three of the crop years during the 
investigated period. The harvest hedges and the Agricultural Stabiliza-
tion and Conservation Service storage fees won twice. The unmodified 
basis change model and the exponential smoothing plan were never the 
front runners for any of the crop years. Tiie harvest hedge with a stop-
loss, the trailing stop using the session highs and lows, always returned 
a higher price on July 15 than on December 1. Of course, the ASCS 
payments always put the outcome in the black. 
129 
Turning to Table 12, the mean net storages incomes ranked and the 
standard deviations are displayed. The harvest hedge without a stop- loss 
was the last place possibility for storage income. 'lhe trailing stop 
strategies decisively exceeded the third place marketing plan. The 
widest separation was between the second and third place methods . The 
high mean net storage income systems carried a high standard deviation. 
As th.e average declined so did the standard deviation . The exponential 
smoothing strategy fell contrary to this trend. If the decision maker is 
a risk averter, he would eliminate this plan . The ASCS storage payments 
had the lowest standard deviation. The elevator operator would not 
select the two last place strategies when the tenth place possibility 
is readily available. Likewise on the top side, those marketing systems 
which exceed the normal cash price change should receive strong con-
sideration. The cash price change is the simplest marketing technique 
in practice. Merchandisers desire profits in excess of the normal price 
change; otherwise the extra mental turmoil of contending with the futures 
market is of no benefit. 
To put more confidence in the numerical ranking in Table 12, the 
F-test is employed. At the five percent level, the data fail to indicate 
that there is any difference except by mere chance. 
The visual ranking of the means describes as much as anything about 
the various mechanical strategies. The trailing stop plans tend to be 
more beneficial than the others. If one employs either of the basis 
strategies and the harvest hedge without a stop-loss he, perhaps, should 
reevaluate his manner of decision making. 
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Table 12. Mean net storage income for each strategy ranked 
Standard 
Ranking Strategy Mean net price deviation 
1 Three cent trailing stop $.23 3/4 .428 
2 Trailing stop with the highs 
and lows .20 .370 
3 Cash price change .15 1/4 .242 
4 Major price trend directional 
indicator .15 1/8 .193 
5 Harvest hedge with the stop-
loss .14 3/4 .185 
6 Exponential smoothing (C = .03) .13 3/8 .206 
7 Three point reversal method .11 3/4 .170 
8 Simple moving average .09 1/2 .143 
9 Modified basis change .08 7/8 .101 
10 ASCS payments .08 5/8 .004 
11 Basis change .08 3/8 .083 
12 Harvest hedge without the stop-
loss .08 1/8 .070 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It can be surmised that the basic hypothesis for the entire investi-
gation was that the decision maker for any stock of grain should hedge if 
prices fall and reamin open on price increases . This hypothesis was 
exemplified by the mechanical hedging strategies. In turn, these were 
set against the marketing operations currently employed in practice. To 
further test the validity of the proposed mathematical marketing systems, 
the advice of professional agricultural economists was added. The pro-
ducer is interested in the total net dollars. To complete the investi-
gation returns to storage were also compared. 
Summarizing some general aspects of the study, it was shown that 
quick surges in a bull or bear market are difficult to contend with. 
One needs to observe the market objectively to allow the price to 
fluctuate but yet continue in the established direction. However, the 
decision maker cannot be too far removed or he incurs a huge loss. Some 
of the proposed me t hods handled this price behavior characteristic 
better than others. lhe trailing stop and the modified basis strategy, 
with the exception of 1972-73 for the latter, were the ones which seem 
to cope with this situation the best. 
For many of these mechanical hedging strategies, a hedge was still 
in effect on July 15. All of the proposed methods were confined to this 
time period. This may have limited some of the returns of the various 
strategies. It may have been advantageous to liquidate all stocks of 
grain at an earlier date or perhaps a later date . 
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There are several assumptions which should be discussed. The first 
is the eight percent interest rate. This will lower the returns part of 
the time and enhance it other times. More importantly, the 
assumption of always receiving the indicated price requires a fantastic 
broker. Few of these individuals are capable of executing at the exact 
price desired due to the volatility of the market. Execution is a key 
element for anyone participating in the futures market. 
The final assumption is that the decision maker was restricted to 
one marketing technique throughout 1962-73. In reality, individuals 
selling corn switch marketing plans often. One crop year they adhere 
to one strategy and next they move to something else. There are few 
individuals who possess the foresight necessary to recognize the proper 
time to substitute one marketing technique for another. Reevaluating the 
market constantly for the strategy best adapted to cope with the price 
fluctuation should be the decision maker's major interest. 
This study demonstrates what strategies have worked the best for the 
entire period. It encompassed time periods of enormous price swings and 
relative serenity. The ideal technique would be to select one for the 
different types of markets. What would be used as the decision making 
variable? If price movements were chosen, how many cents and over what 
period of time would one make the decision to alter the strategy. Hind-
sight is perfect but who knows what the future will dictate. The trailing 
stop strategies seemed to contend with the entire 1962-73 period the best. 
When 1972-73 was excluded it fell back but this strategy allows price to 
vary more than many of the other plans before entering the market. This 
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marketing plan leaves a certain amount of the responsibility of price risk 
on the decision maker. The risk taker can, perhaps, capture six cents 
more by selling his cash corn properly. This system does attempt to keep 
the producer from looking foolish for having sold his crop too soon. What 
are the benefits of the second place trailing stop to a producer of 160 
acres of corn, as compared to the harvest hedge with the stop-loss. 
Assume there is a one hundred bushel yield. The total production would 
be 16,000 bushels. The additional net profits would be $720.00. For an 
elevator that handles 1,000,000 bushels of corn, the increased net returns 
would be $45,000. Neither of these figures include the profit already 
derived from handling and are in addition to that normally earned • • These 
marketing techniques require little judgment on behalf of the decision 
maker. An astute individual with a good "feel" of the corn market could 
perhaps generate further positive returns due to the confinements of the 
mechanical hedging strategies. 
This investigation points out the benefits of constantly monitoring a 
hedge. Having stop-losses strategically placed can mean a substantial 
savings. The crude and arbitrary stop-loss of ten percent illustrated some 
positive benefits. The rule-of-thumb for profitable speculation applies 
to hedging as well as speculating. It is that a speculator should let his 
profits run and cut his losses short. This investigation lends support to 
the statement as being a worthwhile bit of advice. It also provides strong 
evidence that losses on a hedge should limited. If the negative returns 
hit the limit, the hedge should be liquidated. There is nothing sacred 
about maintaining a hedge. Constant hedge surveillance with a willingness 
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to make several hedges during one crop year should be the general model 
for hedging theory. 
The results indicate other beneficial outcomes for the producer and 
merchandiser. Hedging advisory services can be meaningful financially to 
involved individuals. Professional recommendations as well as hedges 
generated by the mechanical strategies could guide the inventory holder 
towards the most beneficial alternative. 
Producers and merchandisers are constantly searching for methods 
to increase profits and to reduce price risk. The methods studied in 
this investigation have considerable potential for increasing the profits 
of producers and grain merchandising.firms. 
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APPENDIX 
Table Al. Changes in limit moves, commissions and hedging margins (28) 
for corn futures on the Chicago Board of Trade 
Limits 
a) The daily limit on price movement on a 5000 bu. contract of corn 
was 8¢ from 1/1/62 to 5/31/73. 
b) The limit was increased to 10¢ on 6/1/73. 
Commissions on corn 
a) In 1961, a 5000 bushel contract (1) could be traded for a $9.00 
commission if you were a member and the price was $.99 7/8 or 
below. It was $18.00 for non""tllembers. When the selling price 
was between $1.00 and $2.24 7/8 (2), it was $22.00 for non-members 
and $11.00 for members. When corn was selling for $2.25 or more, 
(3) the conmission rose to $12.00 for members and $24.00 for non-
members. 
b) From 1962-1970, it cost $22.00 for non-members and $11.00 for 
members. 
c) From 1970-1973, the comnission increased to $30.00 for non-
members and $15.00 for members. 
Margin Requirements for corn hedgers 
a) From 1962 to 1965, the margin requirement was fixed at $200 per 
contract. 
b) From 1/1/66 to 9/20/66, the margin was to be maintained at $250.00. 
c) From 9/21/66 to 2/15/67, the margin jumped to $400.00. 
d) From 2/16/67 to 1/12/68, the margin declined to $300.00 per 
contract. 
e) From 1/13/68 to 8/18/70, the margin dropped to $250.00. 
f) From 8/19/70 to 3/4/71, it doubled to $500.00. 
g) From 3/5/71 to 9/22/71, it was $400.00. 
h) From 9/23/71 to 9/25/72, the margin leveled off at $300.00. 
i) From 9/26/72 to 12/6/72, the margin rose to $400.00. 
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Table Al. (continued) 
j) From 12/7 /72 to 3/27/73, it climbed to $500.00. 
k) From 3/28/73 to 5/29/73, it fell to $400 for each contract. 
1) From 5/30/73 to 5/31/73, it stepped up to $500.00. 
m) From 6/1/73 to 6/4/73, the margin reached $750.00. 
n) From 6/5/73 to 10/18/73, the margin peaked at $1000 per corn 
contract. 
o) From 10/19/73 to 12/31/73, it decreased to $750.00. 
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Table A2. The average weekly central Iowa basis and standard deviations 
for July corn from 1962-74 in dollars 
Week no. Average basis Average standard deviation 
la .26432 .08709 
2 • 27166 .09595 
3 .28094 .09819 
4 .28241 .07070 
5 .28417 .06107 
6 . 27725 .06622 
7 .27824 .06289 
8 .27542 .05609 
9 .27365 .06732 
10 .25494 .05515 
11 .23634 .05823 
12 .23849 .06131 
13 . 21541 .05299 
14 .17164 .03603 
15 .19370 .03589 
16 .18714 .03081 
17 .18109 .03433 
18 .17913 .03333 
19 .18121 .03402 
20 .17737 .03201 
"\leek no. 1 begins on October 1. 
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Table A2. (continued) 
Week no. Average basis 
21 .18309 
22 .19028 
23 .18874 
24 .18504 
25 .17984 
26 .17529 
27 .17266 
28 .17032 
29 .16401 
30 .15729 
31 .15388 
32 .15973 
33 .14595 
34 .14358 
35 .14272 
36 .15459 
37 .15360 
38 .15320 
39 .16133 
40 .16233 
41 .16903 
42b .16903 
bweek no. 42 ends on July 19. 
Average standard deviation 
• 039 59 
.03324 
.04218 
.04336 
.04229 
.04196 
.04154 
.04053 
.03895 
.039 57 
.03776 
. 02839 
.03432 
.04747 
.03489 
.05297 
.05377 
.05252 
.07141 
.07389 
.07585 
.07585 
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